Impact of Perk on Corporate Performance: The Mediating Effect of Agency Cost

Yulin GE, Jing YE

Abstract


As an important part of the executive compensation，perks can play a unique role in facilitating corporate performance. The relationship among agency cost, perk and corporate performance is a key issue faced by scholars. This paper selects companies listed on the Shanghai and Shenzhen stock exchanges from 2011 to 2016 as samples, excluding ST, ST * companies and financial insurance companies. We found that executive’s perk has a significant negative correlation with corporate performance. And executive’s perk has a significant positive correlation with agency cost. Through the influence of perk on corporate performance and agency cost, this study found that agency cost has a partial intermediary effect between perk and company performance.


Keywords


Perk; Corporate performance; Agency cost

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References


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DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.3968/10623

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