Study on Unlawful Dismissal Compensation Based on a Cooperative Game Model

Chunling ZUO

Abstract


In China, collective disputes on unlawful dismissal compensation resulted from lock-out or workplace relocation are increasing. However a reasonable compensatory standard doesn’t take shape because regulations in Labor Contract Law of PRC don’t reflect the formation mechanism of compensation accurately. The paper try to make a case study based on a cooperative game model, and draw the conclusion that it is risk preference of bargaining parities impacts the compensatory amount.


Keywords


Unlawful dismissal compensation; Cooperative game; Risk preference

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References


Brams, S. J., & Taylor, A. D. (2013). The win-win solution. Beijing: Renmin University of China Press.

Xie, Z. Y. (2010). Employers’ compensatory liability for unfair dismissal, science of law. Journal of Northwest University of Politics and Law, (03).

Xie, S. Y. (2014). Economic game theory (pp.346-358). Shanghai: Fudan University Press.




DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.3968/n

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