

## The Spanish Synthetic Future as a Means of Expression of Inference

Anja Hennemann<sup>[a],\*</sup>

<sup>[a]</sup>Institute for Romance Studies, Potsdam University, Potsdam, Germany.  
\*Corresponding author.

Received 15 April 2014; accepted 26 June 2014  
Publish online 27 August 2014

### Abstract

The present paper analyses the inferential use of the Spanish synthetic future form, i.e. examples in which the future is used as an inferential marker. The examples are retrieved from the search engine *GlossaNet*, more precisely, from the Spanish daily newspapers *El País* and *El Mundo*. This study does not aim to be a quantitative one. It is a qualitative study where the data are used to verify/refute the theoretical basis. It is, for example, not my intention to show in how many cases of a certain total amount of uses the Spanish synthetic future form is used to express inference. It is argued that the label “inferential future” (instead of “epistemic future”) should be preferred. Additionally, the synthetic future is shown to convey inferences of different strengths: *será + sin duda* (“it will/must be + without a doubt”), for instance, represents a stronger inference, while with *será + probablemente* (“it will/must be + probably”) a weaker inference is expressed.

**Key words:** Spanish synthetic future; Evidentiality; Inference

Hennemann, A. (2014). The Spanish Synthetic Future as a Means of Expression of Inference. *Studies in Literature and Language*, 9(1), 11-26. Available from: <http://www.cscanada.net/index.php/sll/article/view/5215>  
DOI: <http://dx.doi.org/10.3968/5215>

### INTRODUCTION

The present study is concerned with the analysis of the inferential use of the Spanish synthetic future form, that is, with uses of the future tense, in which no future time is expressed or at least “backgrounded” (Hennemann, 2013,

p.381–399). In the following two examples, for instance, the future is used as an inferential marker:

(1) ... Zapatero ha advertido de que el tercer trimestre del año “**será** peor que el segundo”, cuando la economía española creció un 0,2% ... . (*El País*, 8 December, 2010)

“Zapatero has indicated that the third quarter of the year ‘**will/must be** worse than the second one’, when the Spanish economy increased 0.2% ...”

(2) Media hora después tenían cama, ducha y una botella de champán como bienvenida. **Será** por eso que asegura: “Lo más divertido de mi trabajo es superar retos”. (*El País*, 5 July, 2010)

“Half an hour later they had a bed, a shower and a bottle of champagne as welcome gift. It **will/must be** for that reason that he assures: ‘The most entertaining thing of my work is overcoming challenges.’”

As the examples above already indicate, all examples to be found in the present study are taken from Spanish daily newspapers, i.e. from *El País* and *El Mundo*. In order to obtain the results I used the search engine *GlossaNet* (<http://glossa.fltr.ucl.ac.be/>). As the user is not able to use asterisks to replace a verbal ending, *GlossaNet* was configured to search for an entire lexical item: the search engine was set up to search for *será*, that is, for the verb *ser* “to be” in 3<sup>rd</sup> person singular, future tense.<sup>1</sup> The results were received by email in text format.

*Será* is found to be used by both journalists and interviewed, quoted persons, as examples (2) and (1) indicate respectively. In general, the newspaper writing style can be divided into two text types: The journalist’s part represents written discourse, while direct quoted speech can be oral in character, even though they clearly cannot be compared with “real” spoken data. Insofar as

<sup>1</sup> In cases of quoting examples containing other forms than *será*, it is because I came across them incidentally.

the utterances that are the subject under discussion are not uttered by a journalist, in which medial writtenness combines with conceptual writtenness, the utterances are marked by conceptual orality, as in example (1). If a formerly interviewed person is interviewed and then quoted, the direct quoted speech is oral in character.<sup>2</sup>

This study does not aim to be a quantitative one. It is, for example, not my intention to show in how many cases of a certain total amount of uses the Spanish synthetic future form is used to express an inference. The focus is on showing *that* the Spanish future *can be used* as an inferential marker.

## 1. SOME THEORETICAL NOTES ON INFERENCE

Generally, inference is regarded one subcategory of evidentiality (Willett, 1988, p.57). Nevertheless, it represents a disputatious topic for scholars like van der Auwera & Plungian (1998) and Cornillie (2009), who discuss whether inference is “more modal” or “more evidential”.

In “Modality’s semantic map” van der Auwera & Plungian represent “cross-linguistically relevant synchronic and diachronic connections between modal, premodal, and post-modal meanings or uses” (1998, p.79). In doing so, they claim to pay special attention “to meanings that are vague between possibility and necessity” (1998, p.79). Nevertheless, they explain

that the inferential reading amounts to epistemic modality and more particularly necessity: For both categories we are dealing with the certainty of a judgment relative to other judgments. From this point of view it also causes no surprise that inferential evidentials often receive an English translation with epistemic *must*. Inferential evidentiality is thus regarded as an overlap category between modality and evidentiality. (van der Auwera & Plungian, 1998, pp.85–86)

Even though it indeed makes sense to regard inference as *the* evidential subcategory where (epistemic) modality and evidentiality overlap, it is not very prudent to analyse *every* inferential reading as amounting to *necessity*. It depends on the evidence that is the basis for the conclusion, and hence [p] expressed as an inference may be *possible*, *probable* or *necessary* (or evens something in between as *highly probable* or *almost necessary*). The following two examples, for instance, contain the synthetic future form *será*, which is used to express a strong inference because it is accompanied by the noun phrase *sin duda* “no/without doubt” (Volkman, 2005, p.299). The inference expressed is thus more necessary than only possible:

- (3) “El sector debe enfrentar una gran reconversión en un plazo de unos cinco años”, vaticina.

<sup>2</sup> For the notions of ‘medial writtenness’ and ‘conceptual orality’ see Koch & Oesterreicher (1994, p.587).

Así **será, sin duda**, cuando las comunidades vayan completando sus decretos ... (*El País*, 30 September, 2010)

“The sector has to face a big structural change within five years, he predicts. So it **will/must be, without doubt**, when the communities are. SUBJ completing their decrees ...”

- (4) Su pianismo lee con personalidad las mejores páginas del jazz americano, a las que suma palabras clásicas y europeas. **Sin duda, será** una de las revelaciones del festival. (*El Mundo*, 31 October, 2010)

“His ‘manner to play the piano’ reads the best pages of American jazz with personality, where he adds classic and European words. **No doubt**, he **will/must be** one of the revelations of the festival.”

The following instance of *será*, in contrast, is used with the verbal phrase *creo que* “I believe/think that”. In comparison to the former examples, this inference seems more possible than (logically) necessary. According to the journalist, the football player is nevertheless “convinced” (*está convencido*) that the current season “may” (*puede*) be better, that is, the speaker does actually not express an inference that [p] necessarily is the case.

- (5) Seydou Keita: “**Creo que será** un buen año”. El jugador del FC Barcelona **Seydou Keita** está convencido que este año el Barça puede hacer una muy buena temporada. (*El Mundo*, September 2, 2010)

“Seydou Keita: ‘**I think that it will/must be** a good year’. The football player from FC Barcelona Seydou Keita is convinced that Barça is able to play a good season this year”.

Cornillie (2009) also takes a stance against van der Auwera & Plungian’s proposal because it

assumes that all inferential statements are concerned with certainty of a judgment. That is, inference is seen as a monolithic concept that lacks any variation. ... Moreover, the proposed correlation between inference and necessity implies that other modes of knowing, such as quotative (or hearsay) evidentiality, are automatically outside the realm of necessity. This implicitly correlates them with weaker forms of modality such as possibility and probability (Cornillie, 2009, p.49).

Cornillie (2009) is obviously right when rejecting the assumption that inferential statements should generally be concerned with certainty. The modal verbs *poder* “may” and *deber* “must”, for instance, can be used to express inference, whereby the former is normally used to express a tentative conclusion, the latter to indicate a stronger one. Diewald and Smirnova (2010, p.92) also “assume that the sub-domains of epistemic necessity and inferential evidentiality can and must be distinguished”. They provide two reasons:

- (a) not every inferential statement needs to have an epistemic modalization;

- (b) not every statement expressing epistemic necessity needs to represent the result of an inferring process (Diewald & Smirnova, 2010, p.92).

However, this is not always as simple as it sounds here. As indicated above, the assumption that inference automatically amounts to epistemic necessity should be rejected. Spanish *poder* and *deber* can both be used to express inference but the modal values going hand in hand with an inference expressed by *poder* and *deber* are, roughly speaking, concerned with lower certainty and higher certainty, respectively. That means there is “something modal about their use”. Therefore, the correlation between inference and necessity in particular should only be rejected, but not – as Diewald & Smirnova formulate with their two reasons – between inference and epistemic modality at all. The discussion about ‘where to put inference?’ is also addressed by other scholars such as Squartini (2001):

... inferential markers, which, even if often consistently treated as evidentials[,] are described as a case of interaction between epistemic modality and evidentiality by Van der Auwera & Plungian (1998, p.86). Their intermediate status is also recognized by Palmer ..., who treats inferentials under the heading judgements when languages such as English or German are concerned ..., while mentioning them in the section devoted to evidentials in a language such as Tuyuca. (Squartini, 2001, pp.297–298)

Gómez Rendón (2006, p.49) says in this connection: “... an interpersonal approach makes clear that inference in E(cuadorian) Q(uechua) may be read not only as a cognitive exercise but also as a commitment of the speaker to the truth of a propositional content.” This is easy to understand since speakers always like to believe in their own conclusions. Nevertheless, Palmer seems to go the right way as he argues that the place of inference is language specific. Statements about inference which lay claim to universal validity should generally be avoided. As Volkmann (2005, p.120) explains, on the one hand evidentiality offers a place for inference because it represents one kind of access to information, and consequently represents one information source. On the other hand, inference is the evidential subcategory that relies more than any other subcategory on knowledge, which obviously lets it appear “more modal” or “more epistemic”. Boye (2006) also describes expressions that indicate an assumption as (possibly) being partly epistemic, partly inferential:

... the “assumption” may be taken to indicate a certain range of degree of epistemic support – assumption in contrast to e.g. certainty – but it may also be taken to indicate a type of evidence – assumption in contrast to e.g. reportive evidence .... Thus, in lack of further information, items and constructions characterized with the term “assumed” or “assumptive” may be taken to encode the meaning of indirect-inferential evidence, the meaning of e.g. partial epistemic support, or both these meanings .... (Boye, 2006, p.66)

So where to put inference then? Is it ‘more modal’ or ‘more evidential’? Obviously, inference is *the* evidential

subcategory where (epistemic) modality and evidentiality overlap, whereby it depends on the evidence that is the basis for the conclusion as to whether the inference amounts to necessity or not. An inferentially marked proposition may be *possible*, *probable* or *necessary* (or something in between such as *highly probable*, *almost necessary* etc.). Even though epistemic modality and evidentiality seem to overlap in inferences, in an inferential use of a certain expression it should be decided whether the evidential component or the epistemic one is more prominent. If the evidential component is regarded as more prominent the expression is labelled “inference”. By contrast, if the epistemic component is considered more prominent in a particular use of an expression, the expression is labelled “assumption” (Boye, 2006, p.66). In summary, inference is situated in between epistemic modality and evidentiality, whereby in an inferential use of a certain expression, the evidential domain is considered clearly more prominent than the epistemic one.

## 2. THE SYNTHETIC FUTURE IN SOME GRAMMARS OF SPANISH

The fact that the synthetic future is used to express inferences is not explicitly addressed by the *Manual* of the RAE:

Se llama futuro de conjetura, futuro de probabilidad o futuro epistémico el que introduce alguna suposición del hablante relativa al presente. Las paráfrasis que admite se forman con adverbios de probabilidad o de duda, en ambos casos con un verbo en presente. Admite también paráfrasis con verbos modales. Todo ello pone de manifiesto su significado modal, a la vez que su valor temporal. En efecto, **Serán las ocho** significa aproximadamente (en uno de sus sentidos) “Probablemente son las ocho” o “Deben de ser las ocho”. (*Manual*, 2010, p.448; emphasis in bold is mine).

... el llamado futuro de conjetura se interpreta como presente de incertidumbre: **Serán las tres de la tarde** equivale, de manera aproximada, a “Son probablemente las tres de la tarde” ... (*Manual*, 2010, p.474; emphasis in bold is mine).

It is called future of conjecture, future of probability or epistemic future, which introduces the speaker’s supposition with regard to the present [situation]. The paraphrases, which it allows, are formed with the help of adverbs of probability or of doubt; in both cases with verbs in present tense. Paraphrases with modal verbs are also possible. All this highlights its modal meaning besides its temporal value. Indeed, **It will/must be eight o’clock** approximately means (in one of its meanings) “It’s probably eight o’clock” or “It must be eight o’clock”.

... the so-called future of conjecture is interpreted as [the] present of uncertainty: **It will/must be three o’clock in the afternoon**. Is approximately equivalent to “It’s probably three o’clock in the afternoon” ...

Although no explicit reference to the inferential reading of the future is made, *Serán las ocho* is paraphrased as *Deben de ser las ocho*, that is, with the

help of the modal that is widely described as being evidential. In the following we will have a closer look at the use of the synthetic future to express inferences.

Actually, open conditions, which are expressed by *Si* “if” + present + future (also possible with the present tense having future meaning; cf. Butt & Benjamin 2004, p. 362), also indicate the inferential aspect of the future form itself. If the formerly mentioned condition is fulfilled, [p] will be/must be the case. But at the moment of speaking, the speaker does not know whether the condition will be fulfilled or not; the condition is still “open”. He nevertheless judges: If the condition is fulfilled, then [p], whereby he cannot know for sure. The speaker infers or assumes that “(then) *será* [p]”:

- (6) **Si** el presidente Obama mantiene su compromiso con estos principios progresistas en sus futuros años de Gobierno ..., Estados Unidos **será** un país más fuerte y más justo gracias a ello. (*El País*, 4 September, 2010)

“If President Obama maintains his compromise with these progressive principles during the next years of government ..., the USA **will/must be** a more powerful and fairer country thanks to that.”

- (7) Según CCOO, **si** no hay avances, la próxima convocatoria **será** la de una huelga general para rechazar el apagón postal y el proyecto de Ley Postal. (*El Mundo*, November 19, 2010)

“According to CCOO, **if** there is no progress, the next convocation ‘**will/must be** the one of a general strike’ to refuse the postal blackout and the project of the postal law.”

- (8) Antes sí me agobiaba, ahora me lo tomo con paciencia. **Si** no llega el momento por algo **será**. ¿Cómo está el mercado musical en España? (*El Mundo*, November 19, 2010)

“Earlier I was bugged, now I am more patient. **If** the [right] moment does not come, there **will/must be** a reason for it. How is the music market in Spain?”

- (9) “**Será** difícil ser campeones **si** los rivales del Barça le regalan los partidos. Un equipo de Primera no puede dar ...”. (*El Mundo*, December 28, 2010)

“It **will/must be** difficult to become champions **if** the rivals of Barça donate him games. A team of the first division should not give ...”

The use of *será* in example (8) is special in so far as the second clause only expresses that there must be a reason, if the condition is fulfilled: “If the (right) moment does not come, there must be a reason for it” (*Si no llega el momento por algo será*). The following example in particular confirms that the future form in open conditions is accompanied by a non-temporal moment. The speaker states “if the condition is fulfilled, then [p] because...”, that is, giving a reason for [p]. Admittedly, the construction in the following example is a very

special one because the fulfilment of the open condition represents [p] in the second clause: “If [p], then [p] because...”:

- (10) **Si** estos señores tienen hueco, **será porque** lo merecen .... Nos creíamos mejores que Italia cuando se presentaba Cicciolina. (*El Mundo*, November 19, 2010)

“**If** these men have a gap, it **will/must be** because they deserve it .... We thought we were better than Italy when Cicciolina presented herself.”

So from uses of the future form as in the example above the step to the inferential/modal use – without being (explicitly) bound to the two-part conditional sentence – is only a small one. The step is a small one because the conditional structure *Si* + present + future itself already represents a supposition or hypothesis. The connection between the structure of conditional sentences and the ‘hypothetical character’ of conditional sentences is also addressed by the *Gramática Descriptiva*:

En primer lugar, existe la creencia generalizada de que toda oración condicional constituye también la formulación de una hipótesis; esto es, es un lugar común considerar que la idea de condición coincide con la de hipótesis (Montolío, 1999, p.3647).

“Firstly, it is generally believed that every conditional sentence also constitutes the formulation of a hypothesis; that is, it is commonly acknowledged to consider that the idea of condition coincides with the [idea] of hypothesis.”

Consequently, the typical conditional structure that results is “[*si p, entonces q*]” (Montolío, 1999, p.3647), whereby a hypothesis may always be confirmed or negated (Montolío, 1999, p.3648), which, in turn, depends on the fulfilment of the condition as the examples above that contain the future form in the second clause show. These utterances are ‘real hypothetical conditionals’:

... puesto que la verificación de una hipótesis sólo puede hacerse en el devenir temporal, en el futuro, sólo las oraciones condicionales en las que la prótasis tiene esa orientación temporal son verdaderas condicionales hipotéticas (Montolío, 1999, p.3648).

Taken for granted that the verification of a hypothesis is only possible in upcoming time, in the future, only the conditional sentences in which the protasis has this temporal orientation are real hypothetical conditionals.

That is why hypothetical conditionals are also called ‘predicting conditionals’ in the sense that they express a prediction, conjecture (Montolío, 1999, p.3648) or a supposition: “Así pues, cuando un hablante utiliza una construcción del tipo [*si p, q*] está estableciendo una suposición y una implicación pragmática entre dos enunciados ...” (Montolío, 1999, p.3649). The conditional structure “*si* + presente de indicativo, presente/futuro de indicativo” is, according to Montolío (1999, p.3658), used to express probability, that is, it is the structure that expresses the highest probability that [p] of the second clause in comparison to those conditional structures



that express improbability and irreality, which represent the other “oraciones condicionales” (Montolío, 1999, p.3657). In any case, every conditional structure describes a situation of contrast where ‘two different worlds’ clash. Whether the speaker decides to choose the conditional structure expressing probability, improbability or irreality depends on his perspective – on his subjective perspective concerning the degree of coincidence of the two worlds:

Al formular una oración condicional [si p, q], se produce una situación de contraste entre dos mundos: aquel en el que se formula la suposición hipotética (mundo de la enunciación o real) y un mundo posible, el creado lingüísticamente por el enunciado, en el que, dado el antecedente, se produce la consecuencia .... La opinión subjetiva del hablante sobre el grado de coincidencia de los dos mundos ... se refleja ... en el uso de unos determinados tiempos y modos verbales. Esta actitud subjetiva ante la probabilidad de cumplimiento de los acontecimientos denotados es lo que se ha llamado también el “universo de creencia” de cada hablante ... (Montolío, 1999, p.3659).

In formulating a conditional sentence [if p, q] a contrastive situation between two worlds is produced: one [world] in which the hypothetical supposition is formulated (the world of enunciation or real [world]) and a possible world, the linguistically created one by the help of the enunciation, where – given the antecedent – the consequence is produced .... The subjective opinion of the speaker about the degree of coincidence of the two worlds ... is reflected ... in the use of particular verbal tenses and moods. This subjective attitude concerning the probability of fulfilment of the denoted situations is what has also been called ‘universe of belief’ of each speaker ...

About the conditional structure *Si* + present + future in particular it is said:

Este esquema temporal expresa por lo general expectativas que el hablante supone bien fundadas; esto es, muy raras veces se utiliza para meras especulaciones, de ahí que algunos especialistas hablen aquí de mundos anticipados factuales ... (Montolío, 1999, p.3664).

This temporal scheme generally expresses expectations which the speaker rates as well grounded; that is, very rarely he uses it for mere speculations. That is why some specialists speak about anticipated factual worlds in this connection ...

These words confirm the assumption that the future may be used to express well-founded expectations or inferences, even if the protases containing *si* – thus the condition for the expectation to be answered – is not explicitly mentioned. More words that confirm the assumption are to be found in in the *Manual* of the *RAE*, where it is explained that ‘epistemic conditionals’ indicating an ‘effect-cause relation’ (*Manual*, 2010, p.906) express an inference or conjecture because the manual provides the following examples to illustrate an epistemic conditional: *Si las calles están mojadas, debe de haber llovido* “If the streets are wet, it must have been raining” and *Si vino a la ciudad, estará en su oficina* “If he came to the city, he must be in his office” (*Manual*, 2010, p.906). “Estas subordinadas condicionales inciden sobre algún

predicado abstracto de inferencia o conjetura al que la apódoxis se subordina: ‘Si se quedó sin dinero, (intuyo que) no habrá ido al cine’ ...” (*Manual*, 2010, p.906).

### 3. THE SPANISH SYNTHETIC FUTURE AS A MARKER OF INFERENCE

Giacalone Ramat & Topadze (2007, pp.7–8) observe that in some languages, evidential meanings “have developed as secondary meanings out of tenses and moods of the verbal system”. Such evidential meanings have developed out of the Spanish *futuro sintético*. But how could it be explained that the synthetic future in Spanish rather fulfils modal/evidential functions – or more precisely, inferential functions (Squartini, 2001; Wachtmeister Bermúdez, 2004) instead of the temporal function? The temporal function is mostly expressed by the periphrastic future form (*ir a* + infinitive). Instead, the synthetic future has become unreliable and redundant in its temporal value. That is why the form could be re-functionalised for modal/evidential uses (Haßler, 1997, p.42; 1998, p.176).

If used temporarily, the future describes a state of affairs that is located in the future with reference to the here and now, that is, with reference to the time of speaking. If it is used as “futuro de probabilidad” (Volkman, 2005, p.287), the speaker expresses his epistemic/evidential attitude concerning the information he transmits. The fact that the synthetic future fulfils – despite its temporal function – also the modal/evidential one is easy to understand because “[f]uturity is never a purely temporal concept; it necessarily includes an element of prediction or some related notion” (Lyons, 1977, p.677).<sup>3</sup> The future is always unknown so that uncertainty is somehow inherent in the future:

... reference to the future, in contrast with reference to the past or the present, is generally, if not always, tinged either with uncertainty or, alternatively, with expectancy and anticipation. Such attitudes are traditionally regarded as modal ... (Lyons, 1995, p.319).

What is conventionally used as a future tense... is rarely, if ever, used solely for making statements or predictions, or posing or asking factual questions, about the future. It is also used in a wider or narrower range of non-factive utterances, involving suppositions, inference, wish, intention and desire (Lyons, 1977, p.816).

The following example may illustrate that one can only “estimate” a future event and that the synthetic future represents an appropriate means to express estimation:

- (11) Los expertos estiman que la demanda **crecerá** un 50% en 10 años. (*El Mundo*, December 23, 2010)  
“Experts estimate that the demand **will/must increase** by 50% in 10 years”.

<sup>3</sup> Wachtmeister Bermúdez (2005, p.121) also assigns the future morpheme a modal meaning and an evidential one.

While in examples (12) and (13) the future “simply” describes events that are situated in the future, examples (14) and (15) additionally contain *previsiblemente* “presumably”. These examples could be described as representing the intermediate stage between “pure” reference to a future event and the non-temporal use of the future. *Previsiblemente* + future shows that the event referred to is tinged with uncertainty, or more precisely, with “no-total-certainty” so that it is neither purely temporal nor purely non-temporal:

- (12) ... muy criticado por la oposición de centro izquierda, ha sido validado por una mayoría de 90 diputados de 179 en el Parlamento, y **próximamente será** presentado como un Proyecto de Ley. (*El Mundo*, November 19, 2010)  
 “... very much criticized by the centre-left opposition, it was confirmed by a majority of 90 deputies of 179 in the Parliament, and it **will soon be presented** as a bill”.
- (13) Ríos ha desvelado que está preparando una nueva iniciativa cinematográfica, el Cinemart, que **será** un festival de cine de autor. Este nuevo proyecto **se celebrará la primavera que viene pero será presentada el próximo diciembre** en los Cines Verdi de Barcelona. (*El Mundo*, November 19, 2010)  
 “Ríos has revealed that he is preparing a new cinematographic initiative, the *Cinemart*, which **will be** an auteur cinema festival. This new project **will be celebrated in next spring** but **will be presented in next December** in the cinemas Verdi de Barcelona”.
- (14) “El desarrollo del vehículo eléctrico requiere la elaboración de un programa de formación ocupacional de calidad específico destinado a un número limitado de profesionales que **previsiblemente será** el objeto real de los nuevos desarrollos”. (*El Mundo*, November 19, 2010)  
 “The development of the electric vehicle requires the elaboration of a specialized training programme designated to a limited number of professionals which **presumably will/must be** the real object of the new developments”.
- (15) Una ambulancia del Servicio de Atención Médica Urgente (SAMU) lo llevó al hospital comarcal de la Marina Baixa, en Villajoyosa, donde ingresó con pronóstico grave, y **previsiblemente será** trasladado de nuevo en las próximas horas al General de Alicante. (*El Mundo*, November 19, 2010)  
 “An ambulance of urgent medical attention service brought him to the local hospital of Marina Baixa, in Villajoyosa, where he was admitted to in a serious condition, and he **will/**

**must presumably be transferred** again within the next hours to *General de Alicante*”.

Indeed, Bybee et al. (1994) even explain that the main function of the future is more a modal than a temporal one:

... the central functions in future grams are intention and prediction. It follows from this that future is less a temporal category and more a category resembling agent-oriented and epistemic modality, with important temporal implications. (Bybee et al., 1994, p.280)

De Haan (2006) simply states: “epistemologically, the speaker cannot know for certain that the event will occur” (de Haan, 2006, p.49), by which he establishes the connection between the (never purely) temporal use of the future and the “future of probability”. In other languages, speakers have the choice between different future morphemes by which they simultaneously express their degree of certainty concerning the state of affairs they are talking about: Bybee et al. (1994, pp.247–248) speak about “pairs of future grams which, in addition to expressing prediction, bear an indication of how convinced the speaker is that the event will come about”. In other words, the speaker can choose between morphemes alongside a certainty scale that goes from “future possibility” up to “future necessity” (Bybee et al., 1994, p.148).

Unlike Squartini (2001) and Wachtmeister Bermúdez (2004), Pietrandrea (2005, 2007) denies an evidential reading for the synthetic future in Italian. In her view, “the epistemic future has a genuine epistemic meaning, without any evidential colouring” (Pietrandrea, 2007, p.40):

The future ... may be in some cases engendered by the existence of a source of evidence, but it never fulfils the function of explicitly encoding it. To put it in another way, the future does not serve the purpose of marking information as inferential, it does not have therefore “source of information” as its core meaning, as a true evidential must have ... (Pietrandrea, 2007, p.42).

Pietrandrea (2007) claims to be able to prove the fact that the future is genuinely epistemic in nature as it “can be employed in purely conjectural contexts; i.e. in contexts lacking any evidential source” (Pietrandrea, 2007, p.41) and wants to illustrate this with the help of the following example:

*Saranno le otto e mezza, immagino*  
 It must be eight thirty, I guess.

She then explains, “It is clear that these contexts cannot be considered as evidential by definition: The speaker simply expresses his opinion, without referring to any evidential source” (Pietrandrea, 2007, p.41). But is it not obvious that the speaker expresses this utterance because he *must* have had some kind of evidence to infer that it must be eight thirty? The parenthetically used *immagino* “I guess” (or: “I imagine”) rather seems to confirm that the speaker transmits a tentative conclusion. Whether

the speaker relies on his biological clock or whether he relies on the altitude of the sun – there *must* be some kind of evidence he relies on (Squartini, 2008). Otherwise he would not have said that it *must* be eight thirty. So the speaker obviously bases his reasoning process on ‘something’, let it be world knowledge (Squartini, 2008). That is why even Pietrandrea (2007, pp.41–42) admits – referring to Squartini (2008) – that “the genuine epistemic nature of the future can be questioned by the fact that the epistemic future ... is grammatical in generic inference contexts ...”. Anyway, it seems to be difficult and certainly not appropriate to analyse examples that are offered without context. If having a look at context-embedded instances of the synthetic future in Spanish, it becomes obvious that it may represent a linguistic means to express inference (even if no clear evidence is provided – such as in example (16) – to infer that [p]):

- (16) El medio no es el culpable. Lo es el mal uso. Y lo que **hará sobrevivir** a los medios tradicionales **serán** las virtudes de toda la vida a las que **tendrán que sumar** una gran formación de sus trabajadores. **Será** imprescindible .... Y un análisis que aporte algo al lector de prensa que tiene un nivel de conocimiento bastante elevado y al que le **dará** bastante igual enterarse un par de horas antes ... (*El País*, August 12, 2010)

“The medium is not the guilty party. It is the bad usage. And what will/must [make] survive the traditional media will/must be the virtues of the whole life against those that will have to sum a big formation of its workers. It will/must be indispensable .... And an analysis which brings what the newspaper reader, who has a fairly elevated knowledge level and for whom it will not matter whether to acknowledge something a few hours earlier ...”

- (17) “Nos conocemos muy bien. No hará falta ningún informe”, dijo Bryant. “Será una eliminatoria muy dura. Deberemos mejorar nuestra concentración para no tener que correr sin sentido como hicimos en algunas fases del partido ante Oklahoma, aunque ellos fueron muy tenaces”, afirmó Phil Jackson, el técnico. (*El País*, 4 May, 2010)

“We know each other very well. A report is not necessary, Bryant said. ‘The qualifying round will/must be very hard. We will have to improve our concentration so that we do not have to run without reason as we did during some phases of the game against Oklahoma, even though they were very persistent’, affirmed Phil Jackson, the technician”.

In example (17) the use of *será* is not obviously inferential although it is highly likely because the speaker certainly knows the teams which are in the same group as his team. This may lead him to conclude that

the preliminaries must be/will be hard. However, this contextual information is not linguistically provided (such as in the example *Saranno le otto e mezza, immagino*). The use of *deberemos* “we will have to”, in contrast, is clearly inferential. The speaker says: “We will have to improve our concentration so that we do not have to run without purpose as we did in a few phases of the match against Oklahoma” (*Deberemos mejorar nuestra concentración para no tener que correr sin sentido como hicimos en algunas fases del partido ante Oklahoma*). So “*deberemos [p]*” clearly represents a conclusion drawn out of formerly made experiences during the match against Oklahoma. The following example could be analysed in similar terms: it is highly probable that Ferrer does not say unfoundedly that he “must be/play very aggressive(ly)”. He certainly knows how Nadal plays and infers from this fact that – against him – he should be an aggressive player:

- (18) “Estoy jugando muy bien esta temporada. Contra Nadal **deberé ser** muy agresivo”, cerró Ferrer ... (*El País*, 4 May 2010)

“‘I am playing very well this season. Against Nadal **I will have to be** very aggressive’, said Ferrer finally ...”

Consequently, the synthetic future forms in examples (17) and (18) may be considered markers of inferentiality, whereby the inference is based on the speaker’s experiences or stored knowledge (Lazard, 2001, p.365).

In “A semantic description of French lexical evidential markers and the classification of evidentials” Dendale & Van Bogaert’s (2007) aim is to “reanalyse” a few French lexical markers (*trouver, avoir l’impression, penser, croire, paraître* and *sembler*) and two grammatical markers (*devoir* and the future form) in terms of evidentiality because already before the “evidentiality era” a selection of these markers was “described in modal terms or in non-technical evidential-like terms, comprising such notions as conclusion, reasoning, calculus, deduction, supposition, assumption, etc. ...” (Dendale and Van Bogaert, 2007, p.66). Their reanalysis is said to show that the semantic differences between the markers can be grasped in terms of evidentiality, whereby the common classification of evidentials is not considered “fine-grained enough to cover all the fine distinctions between semantically similar lexical expressions” (Dendale & Van Bogaert, 2007, p.65). In their study of the French future, the form is denied to be a “real” evidential marker (this is in line with Pietrandrea’s (2005, 2007) statements about the future):

It is a [sic] more a kind of assertion marker or alethic marker (saying something about the truth value of the proposition), but one that can be used in an evidential strategy.

The inferential or purely speculative reading it generally gives rise to stems from the fact that any information created by the speaker but which he cannot verify at the moment of speaking, must be inferred information (Dendale & Van Bogaert, 2007, p.83).



This brings up the question whether empirical data from *Frantext*, for instance, would have confirmed that the future “is not an evidential marker” (Dendale & Van Bogaert, 2007, p.83).

Concerning the Italian future Giacalone Ramat & Topadze (2007) somehow criticise that the future has received the label “epistemic future”: They “prefer to highlight the inferential basis for the speaker’s confidence and to use the label inferential future, in line with Squartini (2001)” (Giacalone Ramat & Topadze, 2007, p.25). I would not only “prefer” to highlight the fact that the synthetic future is often used inferentially, I would even exclude a pure modal use. If not used to express future time, then it is used to express an inference<sup>1</sup>. Giacalone Ramat & Topadze conclude:

The epistemic future is inferential in nature. It is based on the speaker’s inference, whose source is not specified: it can be either external or internal, based on either hearsay or reasoning. ... The future can express judgments based upon an inferential process, which may be not explicit ... (Giacalone Ramat & Topadze, 2007, p.26).

That is why they also disagree with Pietrandrea (2005), who says regarding the use of the Italian future: “... unlike the modals, the future seems not to condense any inferential process, but appears to function as the form expressing the speaker’s genuine opinion about the propositional content” (Pietrandrea, 2005, p.93). Disagreeing with Pietrandrea, Giacalone Ramat & Topadze show that the Georgian future – just as the Italian future – may be used to express inference (2007, p.18). Pietrandrea, by contrast, describes the future as a means of expression of the speaker’s subjective opinion, whereby it is regarded as neutral as to the degree of certainty (Pietrandrea, 2005, p.94, p.98). I wonder whether the Italian future can really be said to be neutral regarding the degree of certainty that is conveyed. It is supposed that by speaking of the “future’s neutrality” Pietrandrea refers to its semantics, that is, the future form itself does not convey a higher or lower degree of certainty in comparison to *dovere* “must” and *potere* “may”, for instance. The degree of certainty is generally estimated higher if an inference is marked by *dovere* in comparison to an inference marked by *potere*. Such an assertion cannot be made with regard to the future. But – with regard to the Spanish future – contextual information may provide hints regarding the speaker’s degree of certainty that the future in a particular context conveys. Furthermore, it should not be stated that the future has “no evidential nuances” (Pietrandrea, 2005, p.101) because similar uses in similar contexts could certainly also be found in Italian:

- (19) ... ha ofrecido un obligado armisticio, que **será sin duda** fugaz ... (*El País*, 1 October, 2010)  
 “... has offered an obliged ceasefire, which **will/must be without a doubt** fugitive ...”

Example (19) clearly indicates that *sin duda* “no doubt” represents contextual information that shows

that in this text passage the degree of certainty conveyed by *será* cannot be regarded as “neutral”. If [*p*] will *undoubtedly* (*without a doubt*) be the case, the degree of certainty is clearly higher than only neutral.

- (20) No obstante, el piloto de Yamaha lo tiene claro. “El objetivo vuelve a ser el podio, para así seguir sumando el máximo de puntos en la carrera por el campeonato del mundo. **Será** importante ir rápidos ...”. (*El País*, October 1, 2010)  
 “However, the Yamaha driver is well aware of it. ‘The objective is the podium again for summing up the maximum of points of the race for the world championship. It will/must be important to go fast ...’”
- (21) ... sus resultados se verán “en un espacio corto de tiempo”. “El éxito de la huelga **será** el cambio de las políticas que están haciendo tanto daño”, ha indicado. (*El País*, September 30, 2010)  
 “... its results will be seen “in a short time span”. “The success of the strike will/must be the change in politics which cause so much pain”, he has indicated.”

Text passages (20) and (21), in contrast, represent examples where indeed no contextual information is provided that would allow any conclusion to be drawn about the degree of certainty conveyed by the forms.

#### 4. EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS

As already indicated, by using the future to express an inference the degree of certainty can vary “from certainty to possibility” (Cornillie, 2009, pp.50–51). In the chapter containing some words about inference it was shown that Cornillie’s and van der Auwera & Plungian’s (1998) views clash here as the latter analyse every inferential reading as amounting to necessity (van der Auwera & Plungian, 1998, pp.85–86). The following examples will demonstrate that it is Cornillie’s view which should be adopted as the examples confirm that the future is used to express inferences of various degrees of certainty.

Even though the phrase *sin duda* “beyond doubt” is usually certainly found in contexts of – at least a little – doubt (cf. Simon-Vandenberg & Aijmer, 2007), the speakers of the following examples are fairly certain that “*será* [*p*]”:<sup>4</sup>

- (22) Para muchos **será sin duda** un descubrimiento [de] la belleza por dentro y por fuera del colegio y residencia A Nosa Señora dos Milagres de Baños de Molgas (Ourense ... (*El País*, April 25, 2010)  
 “For many [people] it **will/must without a doubt be** a discovery of beauty from the inside and the outside of the college and the residence A

<sup>4</sup> However, in other contexts *sin duda* is not a strong personal commitment marker but reveals an intersubjective dimension and is attributed to the hearer.



- Nosa Señora dos Milagres de Baños de Molgas* (Ourense) ...”
- (23) ... por lo que podría deducirse que la elección sobre su línea editorial, **sin duda será** entre los laboristas y los liberales demócratas. (*El País*, April 25, 2010)  
 “... which leads to the conclusion that the election about his editorial line, **will/must without a doubt be** between the supporters of the Labour Party and the liberal democrats.”
- (24) Yo creo que un líder de la oposición, además de criticar al gobierno y decir que la situación económica va a mejorar (**sin duda, mejorará** por una cuestión de ciclos) ... (*El Mundo*, April 26, 2010)  
 “I think that a leader of the opposition, besides criticizing the government and saying that the economic situation is going to improve (**no doubt, it will/must improve** as it is a question of cycles) ...”
- (25) ... el ex entrenador de Barcelona y del Betis **tendrá** varios asuntos a resolver. El más importante **será sin duda** el futuro tanto de Gonzalo Castro como de Akihiro Ienaga. (*El Mundo*, April 30, 2010)  
 “... the ex-trainer of Barcelona and [Real] Betis **will/must have** various things to resolve. The most important [one] **will/must undoubtedly be** the future of Gonzalo Castro and Akihiro Ienaga.”
- (26) La Copa del Rey, que va a definir durante el primer mes del año 2011 a los equipos que se jugarán las semifinales **será sin duda** uno de los grandes objetivos ... (*El Mundo*, December 30, 2010)  
 “The King’s Cup, which during the first month of 2011 is going to define the teams which will play in the semi-finals **will/must undoubtedly be** one of the big objectives ...”

The fact that *sin duda* is often found in connection with the inferential future is supported by Volkmann (2005, p.299), who describes the prepositional phrase as an inferential marker. She also offers the sample sentence *Sin duda pretenderá sacar venta ja de la confusión reinante en el equipo español* (Volkmann, 2005, p. 299). Hence, in summary the speakers in the examples above express an inference and it is intersubjectively comprehensible that these are inferences they are fairly certain of.

In the two examples that follow *será* is also used to convey a relatively high degree of certainty, whereby in example (28) the degree of certainty is assumed to be slightly higher than in example (27) because *Todo indica que* “Everything indicates that” refers to certain circumstances which the conclusion is drawn from. *Todo hace suponer que* “Everything leads to the supposition that”, in contrast, introduces an inference of a slightly lower degree of certainty:

- (27) **Todo hace suponer que** la crisis económica **será** el auténtico banco de pruebas del presidente ... (*El País*, July 27, 2010)  
 “**All leads to the supposition that** the economic crisis **will/must be** the authentic test bank of the president ...”
- (28) Igualmente subirán el impuesto a las viviendas más caras y el que pagan las empresas tabacaleras. **Todo indica que** el aumento de impuestos **será aprobado** en el Parlamento. (*El País*, April 25, 2010)  
 “Similarly the real estate taxes and the tobacco taxes will increase. **All this indicates that** the rise of taxes **will/must be approved** in the Parliament.”

*Suponer* – being a verb of cognitive attitude – seems more subjective in its use (Cappelli, 2007, p.217; Hennemann, 2012, pp.163–166; 2013, pp.307–309) than *indicar* because it does not refer to perceivable facts such as *indicar* which refers to some facts in example (28). Even though being an “element of subjectivity” (Cappelli, 2007, p.217), in example (27), however, *suponer* does not appear in its “most subjective use” because it is not used in its qualificational, non-descriptive construal. Instead, it is used intersubjectively such as *indicar*: *Todo hace suponer que* as well as *Todo indica que* is a construction which expresses that [*p*] is regarded as intersubjectively comprehensible. In the following example, in contrast, the verb is used qualificationally and non-descriptively. While the inferential use of the verb is underlined by the inferential future, the inferential future underlines the inferential use of the verb:

- (29) **Supongo que** el futuro **será** una combinación de supervivientes y nuevas empresas: **habrá** medios tradicionales **que se habrán adaptado** bien. (*El País*, July 27, 2010)  
 “**I suppose that** the future **will/must be** a combination of survivors and new companies: there **will/will have to be** traditional media which **will/will have to be adapted** well.”

The following example is comparable to examples (27) and (28) because it contains a similar phrase: *Todo apunta a que* “everything points towards/indicates that” is comparable to the phrases used in the examples above. Everything points to “*será* [*p*]”, that is, everything leads to the inference expressed by the future:

- (30) ... **todo apunta a que** España, pese a haber salido de la recesión, afronta, unos años de crecimiento anémico. **Y que** una recuperación tan débil **será** incapaz de generar empleo con la fuerza necesaria ... (*El País*, August 3, 2010)  
 “... **all this points to that** Spain, due to having overcome the recession, faces a few years of anaemic increase. **And that** such a weak recuperation **will/must be** incapable to generate the employment with the necessary force ...”

In example (31) the future is also used in inferential contexts, which is underlined by *podría deducirse* (“one could conclude”), but here the inference is built on recently uttered words (*por lo declarado recientemente por él mismo*), i.e. previously uttered words represent the basis for the inference that is indicated by the future (*hablará*) and underlined by *podría deducirse*:

- (31) En esta tesitura, González Macho sería el serio. **Podría deducirse, por lo declarado recientemente por él mismo, que** su programa por venir **hablará** de la Ley Audiovisual ... (*El Mundo*, March 16, 2011)  
 “With this pitch of voice González Macho would be the serious [one]. **It could be deduced, because of what he himself has declared recently**, that his future programme **will/must talk** about the audiovisual law ...”

The following uses of *será* are also inferential. As contextually provided information shows, it is used in contexts of “fairly-certainty”:

- (32) La posición del laborismo en ese debate **será seguramente** uno de los puntos cruciales en el discurso que mañana pronunciará el nuevo líder, Ed Miliband ... (*El País*, September 30, 2010)  
 “The position of the Labour movement in this debate **will/must certainly be** one of the crucial points in the discourse which tomorrow is to be pronounced by the new leader Ed Miliband ...”

*Será* and *atacará* in example (33), by contrast, are clearly used evidentially: they indicate that [*p*] is an inference, which is underlined by *seguramente* “certainly” – a modal adverb that is also often used to mark a proposition evidentially (Hennemann, 2012, pp.153–155; 2013, pp.270–275). The speaker is fairly certain that [*p*] will be/must be the case:

- (33) “... Lo que más me preocupa es responder y los rivales”. Entre ellos, el belga Philippe Gilbert, que **seguramente atacará y será** uno de los peligrosos”, apunta el español. (*El País*, October 1, 2010)  
 “... What I am mostly worried about is fighting back and our rivals’. Among them, the Belgian Philippe Gilbert, who **will/must certainly attack and will/must be** one of the dangerous [ones]’, explains the Spaniard.”

The following example is to be analysed in similar terms:

- (34) ... los problemas que encontraron para desmontar el módulo hicieron imposible el cambio, ha informado la NASA. Por eso, se va a realizar un nuevo paseo espacial, no antes del miércoles, y **seguramente será** necesario uno más para terminar la tarea. (*El País*, August 11, 2010)  
 “... the problems which were found for dismounting the module made the change impossible, the NASA has informed. That is why

one is going to realize another walk in space, not before Wednesday, and **it will certainly be** necessary to have one more to end this task”.

Example (35) is clearly the most interesting example I came across. The future form is not only accompanied by *seguramente* but also preceded by *pienso que* “I think that”:

- (35) El rival será el Fulham, la gran sorpresa de esta competición y un equipo del que Quique no se fia: “yo desconfío siempre de los equipos que llegan a una final. **Pienso que seguramente será** un equipo muy competitivo y muy inglés, es decir, muy difícil”. (*El País*, May 2, 2010)  
 “The rival will be Fulham, the big surprise of this competition and a team which Quique does not trust: ‘I always distrust teams that get to the final. **I think that it will/must certainly be** a very competitive and very English team, that is, very challenging’.”

In analysing this example the broader context should also be considered: The utterance before the one containing *pienso que seguramente será* may underlie this: the speaker always distrusts (soccer) teams that get to the final (*yo desconfío siempre de los equipos que llegan a una final*). That means the speaker draws a conclusion out of his live experience. In Willet’s terms it is an inference belonging to the subcategory “reasoning” (1988, p.57). Similar to *seguramente* is the phrase *seguro que* “it is certain that” or the postponed *seguro* “for sure”:

- (36) En el Bernabéu **será** muy parecido. **Seguro que** les va a costar mucho. Otra cosa es que nosotros ... (*El País*, May 4, 2010)  
 “In the Bernabeu [stadium] it **will/must be** very similar. [It is] **sure that** it is going to cost them a lot. Another thing is that we ...”  
 (37) \* 33 Dardo - 26-08-2010 - 23:05:21h Es Vd. (JUAM) optimista. La noche talibana **será** un paréntesis, **seguro**; pero no sabemos su extensión temporal. Tal vez se pierda esta batalla; pero estamos obligados (Occidente) a no perder esta guerra (choque de civilizaciones). (*El País*, August 30, 2010)  
 “... The Taliban night **will/must be** a parenthesis, **for sure**; but we do not know its temporal extension. Maybe we lose this fight; but we (occident) are obliged to not lose this war (confrontation of civilisations)”.

If [*p*] – besides being marked by the future – is marked by *seguro (que)* or *seguramente*, the future is clearly used to convey an inferential reading. The point that should be emphasised, however, is that the speaker is not absolutely certain that [*p*] but fairly certain.

In contrast to *será + sin duda* and *será + seguro (que)/seguramente*, the speaker’s degree of certainty is lowered if “*será [p]*” is additionally marked by *probablemente*:

- (38) El director general de la Policía y la Guardia Civil, Francisco Javier Velázquez ha anunciado

hoy que “**probablemente será** suspendido” ...(*El País*, 25 April, 2010)

“Today the general director of the police and civil guard Francisco Javier Velázquez has announced that ‘he **will probably be** suspended’ ...”

- (39) Se está debatiendo una regulación de solvencia que **probablemente será** muy exigente en el nuevo marco de Basilea III y que se pretende poner en marcha a finales de 2012. (*El País*, 4 May, 2010)

“There is a debate going on about the regulation of the borrowing capacity which **will probably be** very demanding in the new market of Basilea III and which is put into operation by the end of 2012.”

So the different phrases (*será + sin duda/seguramente/probablemente*, for instance) in which the synthetic future appears demonstrate that inferentiality does not necessarily amount to necessity. If the future is used with *probablemente* the speaker expresses a weaker inference and if the future is used in connection with *sin duda* the speaker clearly expresses a stronger inference. This highlights how one and the same linguistic form is “affected” by the context. The fact that this “affectedness” is not necessarily bound to the immediate context because a linguistic form may not only be affected by other expressions at the sentence level but also by expressions beyond the sentence level was already shown in the present study.

In example (40) it is reasonable to assume that *significará* “will/must mean” and *deberá ratificar* “must. Fut. confirm” are used inferentially, whereby it seems not only reasonable but obvious that *será* is used to convey an inferential reading because it is followed by *pues* “since/because” indicating the reason or explanation why “*será [p]*”:

- (40) La puesta en marcha de las centrales **significará** una inyección multimillonaria a la deprimida economía del país. El Parlamento **deberá ratificar** las licencias, pero ese paso **no será** más que un trámite, **pues** el Gobierno tiene amplia mayoría. (*El País*, 25 April, 2010)

“To put the central [ones] into operation **will/must mean** an injection of several millions into the depressed economy of the country. The Parliament **will have to ratify** the licenses, but this step **will not/does not have to be** more than a formality **because** the government has the vast majority.”

In example (41) the future form *habrá* “(there) will/must be” is also followed by a conjunction that indicates why “*habrá [p]*”. The speaker says that “in Spain a political change will take place *because* its party is prepared to govern” (*habrá cambio político en España porque su partido está preparado para gobernar*). So the speaker offers a justification for the reason why

“*habrá [p]*”. That is why the utterance could be rewritten as because of the fact that Spain’s party is prepared to govern, a political change will take place:

- (41) ... **habrá** cambio político en España **porque** su partido está preparado para gobernar, y “da igual” quién sea el candidato del PSOE en las próximas elecciones generales, “si Zapatero, Rubalcaba, Pepiño o la Chacón”. (*El Mundo*, 30 December, 2010)

“... there **will/must be** a political change in Spain **because** his party is preparing to govern, and ‘it does not matter’ who is.SUBJ the candidate for PSOE in the next general elections, ‘if [it is] Zapatero, Rubalcaba, Pepiño or la Chacón’.”

In example (42) the reason for “*será [p]*” is indicated by *ya que* “because” and *es más que probable que* “it is more than likely that”, whereby the fulfilment of the condition *en caso de pasar* “if it wins” is involved. The speaker says: “The matches are going to take place on 12 and 19 January and it will/must be the last ‘comfortable’ preliminary round for the team because if it wins it is more than likely that it will have to compete against Barcelona in the semi-final”:

- (42) Los partidos serán el 12 y el 19 de enero y ésta **será** la última eliminatoria “cómoda” para el equipo **ya que** en caso de pasar, **es más que probable que** el rival en semifinales fuera el Barcelona. (*El Mundo*, 19, November, 2010)

“The matches are going to take place on 12 and 19 January and it **will/must be** the last “comfortable” preliminary round for the team **because** if it wins **it is more than likely that** it will have to compete against Barcelona in the semi-final.”

The speaker in the following example also indicates why “*será [p]*”. By using the conjunction *porque* “because” the speaker establishes a causal relation between his inference and the reason for his inference:

- (43) El récord **no será** difícil de superar, **porque** a la máquina ... (*El País*, 4 September, 2010)

“It **will not/does not have to be** difficult breaking the record, **because** for the machine ...”

Examples (44) and (45) show inferential uses of *será*, whereby the degree of certainty – varying from possibility to certainty – is not unequivocally determinable. That is to say, the context does not always provide information which gives some indication of the degree of certainty that is expressed:

- (44) “Hay que dudar”, pide el compatriota de Disney, cuyo origen ... “**será hoy** y siempre una leyenda”. (*El País*, 4 May, 2010)

“One should have doubt”, demands Disney’s compatriot, whose origin ... ‘**will/must be** a legend **today** and forever’.”

- (45) “Cuando los músicos más grandes están volviendo a las discográficas más humildes, **por algo será** ...” (*El País*, July 27, 2010)



“When the greatest musicians are regressing to more modest record labels, there **will/must be a reason**. ...”

In example (44) contextually provided information shows that *será* is used to convey an inferential reading because the speaker does not utter *es hoy y siempre será una leyenda* “today it is a legend and it will always be”. As the speaker says *será hoy*, he uses the future tense to refer to the present time, that is, to express an inference. The speaker in example (45) utters: “When (if) the greatest musicians go back to more modest record labels, there must be a reason” (*por algo será* “there must be a reason”) for it. So the speaker infers that this does not happen without any reason. However, it could also be argued that the speaker does no more than assume that [*p*] and that this assumption is based on intuition. Assumptions are seen as (possibly) being partly epistemic, partly inferential (Boye, 2006, p.66). According to Boye (2006), expressions that could be labelled with the term “assumptive” “may be taken to encode the meaning of indirect-inferential evidence”, an epistemic meaning, or both these meanings (Boye, 2006, p.66). The following use of *será* may also be described as conveying an assumption:

(46) Nunca un largo periodo de posesión producirá en el público y en los jugadores la reacción entusiástica que suscita un gol. **Por algo será.** (*El País*, August 30, 2010)

“A large period of [ball] possession will never produce the [same] enthusiastic reaction in the audience and in the players a goal does. There **will/must be a reason**”.

Example (47) may also be said to express (only) an assumption based on intuition, whereby it is reasonable to assume that the speaker 1. knows the teams his team has to compete against in the preliminary round and that the speaker 2. knows that the preliminaries will be/must be complicated because his team has already competed against (some or one) of the other teams. In summary, the degree of certainty of these three uses of *será* in the text passages above is not unequivocally determinable:

(47) ... Iniesta destacó el carácter con el que afronta esta competición el equipo vasco: “**Será** una eliminatoria bonita, complicada, con la vuelta fuera de casa y ante un rival que en esta competición hace mucho daño”. (*El Mundo*, November 19, 2010)

“... Iniesta emphasized the character with which he faces the Basque team in this competition: ‘It **will/must be** a nice preliminary round, complicated, with the return leg away from home and against a rival that in this competition causes a lot of pain.’”

In comparison to the assumptions above, the following uses of *será* convey a higher degree of certainty as contextually provided information shows. Inferential uses of *será* can often be explained by contextual information

which is “grammatical in nature”. In a few examples above, for instance, an explanation for ‘*será* [*p*]’ is established by causal conjunctions. In the following example, in contrast, the inferential use of the future must be explained by (contextually provided) world knowledge. The speaker explains: “The second leg must be/will be similar to that we played here in the Calderón. It must be/will be a difficult match”. So it is the “second leg” which illustrates that the uses of *será* are inferential. Obviously, the speaker<sup>5</sup> has already seen the first leg; otherwise he could not say that he expects the matches to be similar. The fact that there is always a first leg for the second leg represents world knowledge:

(48) “**El partido de vuelta será** muy parecido al que jugamos aquí en el Calderón. **Será** un partido difícil. ...” (*El Mundo*, December 30, 2010)

“The second leg **will/must be** similar to that we played here in the Calderón. It **will/must be** a difficult match.”

In the following three examples the speech-accompanying verbs *calcular* “to calculate”, *concluir* “to conclude” and *vaticinar* “to vaticinate, to predict” support the fact that the uses of *será* are inferential. These verbs are clearly used in inferential contexts:

(49) Esto se explica, según la consultora, por “el deterioro del gasto de las familias y la disminución en la entrada de turistas extranjeros”. **Así, DBK calcula que** la facturación de este mercado **será** de 1.600 millones en 2010, un 10% menos que el año anterior. (*El Mundo*, December 30, 2010)

“This is explained, according to the consultant, by ‘the decreasing spending by families and the declining numbers of foreign tourists’. **So DBK calculates that** the account of this market **will/must be** 1600 million in 2010, 10% less than the year before.”

(50) “...Voy a pasar un tiempo antes en Japón, y **será** una buena ocasión para relajarme y estar listo para el que pienso que **será** un gran fin de semana”, **ha concluido**. (*El País*, 1 October, 2010)

“... I am going to spend some time in Japan before, and it **will/must be** a good occasion to relax and get ready for the – what I think **will/must be** a great – weekend?, **he concluded**.”

(51) Una temporada de huracanes muy activa. Los meteorólogos **vaticinan que será** una temporada “muy activa” **porque** entre cuatro y seis huracanes podrían ser de gran intensidad, con vientos superiores a 177 kilómetros por hora. (*El País*, September 4, 2010)

<sup>5</sup> Obviously, the speaker is the trainer because he uses *jugar* in the first person plural (*jugamos* “we played”) and simultaneously speaks about *ellos* “they” when he refers to the team. This is a peculiarity of trainers’ speech.

“A season of very active hurricanes. Weather forecasters **predict that it will/must be** a “very active” season **because** between four and six hurricanes might be very intense, with a maximum wind speed of 177 km/h.”

Furthermore, in example (49) *así* “thus, hence” is to be found, which establishes a causal relation between information that is previously mentioned and the reason for the following inference, which is introduced by *DBK calcula que*. And in example (51) the causal conjunction *porque* “because” indicates the reason for the inference so that a similar causal relation is established between [p] marked by the future and the reason for inferring that [p]. While *será* in example (50) is part of the literally quoted fragment so that it clearly marks an inference, the uses of *será* in examples (49) and (51) are comparable to the use of the adverb *supuestamente*. The adverb was shown to be used to transmit an inference made by another speaker than the current one, by what an inferential and reported reading consequently overlap (Hennemann, 2012, pp.155–157; 2013, pp.276–278). In examples (51) and (49) the speech-accompanying verbs back up the fact that *será* is used inferentially, whereby the verb forms + *que* show that [p] (marked by *será*) represents reported information. The following example is very similar to example (51):

- (52) **Fuentes de Bienestar Social adelantaron ayer que** esta oferta también **será rechazada** “porque no tiene dónde prestar el servicio”, y atribuyeron a “un error” que se presentase al concurso. (*El País*, August 12, 2010)  
“**Sources from Bienestar Social anticipated yesterday that** this offer **will/must also be rejected** ‘because it does not contain where to hire the service’, and they attributed ‘an error’, which is presented.SUBJ to the contest”.

The reportive and the inferential reading of *será* seem to overlap. The reference to the source is given and a justification for why “*será* [p]” is given as well (because of *porque*), whereby the latter is represented by a literally quoted fragment. This leads to the assumption that the *Fuentes de Bienestar Social* also used *será* in order to express an inference. Thus, the inference is reported information.

In the following two examples the speech-accompanying verbs *prever* “to foresee” and *predecir* “to predict” may also be considered as being inferential in nature, such as the verbs *calcular* “to calculate”, *concluir* “to conclude” and *vaticinar* “to vaticinate, to predict”. If a speaker foresees or predicts that “*será* [p]” he is assumed to have based his prediction on certain facts. Hence, the speech-accompanying verbs back up the fact that the following future forms are used inferentially:

- (53) Sergio Scariolo, el seleccionador, **prevé que** el Mundial que empieza mañana en Turquía **será** difícil y atípico por las bajas que afectan a todas las selecciones, incluida la española ... (*El País*, August 30, 2010)

“Sergio Scariolo, the national coach, **anticipates that** the world championship, which begins tomorrow in Turkey, **will/must be** difficult and atypical because of the deficits which affect the representative teams, including the Spanish [one]...”

- (54) En el Arsenal, Fábregas y Robin van Persie **podrán** actuar juntos por primera vez desde agosto. “Nuestra actuación en casa en la segunda vuelta de la temporada **será** decisiva”, **predijo** Arsene Wenger ... (*El Mundo*, December 27, 2010)  
“In Arsenal, Fábregas and Robin van Persie **will/must be able to** play together for the first time since August. ‘Our team play at home during the second leg of the season **will/must be** decisive’, **predicted** Arsene Wenger ...”

While the use of *será* in example (53) is – as in the examples above – comparable to the use of the adverb *supuestamente*, *será* in example (54) is part of the literally quoted fragment so that it clearly marks an inference, which is emphasised by the verb *predecir* “to predict”.

A further context in which the synthetic future is used to convey an inferential reading are weather forecasts. The weatherman would not say that it will be windy or cold, if he had not previously analysed weather charts, for instance. That is why one could argue that weather reports are always inferential in nature, whereby the degree of certainty that is conveyed is estimated to be relatively high:

- (55) ... en regiones montañosas del norte, con cotas de nieve en torno a los 900 o 1.000 metros en el norte y entre 1.000 y 1.200 metros en el centro. “En el resto **soplará** viento de componente norte y **habrá** temperaturas más bien bajas, con lo cual el tiempo **será** más bien frío y desapacible”, apuntó. Esta situación **persistirá** hasta el martes o miércoles de la próxima semana, cuando posiblemente entre otra borrasca en la península. “En resumen, **habrá** tiempo desapacible con el paso de estas borrascas ...” (*El Mundo*, November 19, 2010)

“... in mountainous regions of the North, with snowy tops about 900 or 1000m in the North and between 1000 and 1200m in the centre. ‘In the rest **will/must blow** north wind and the temperature **will/must be** fairly low, so that the weather **will/must be** relatively cold und uncomfortable’, he pointed out. This situation **will/must persist** till Tuesday or Wednesday next week, when other thunderstorms possibly come. SUBJ to the isle. ‘In summary, the weather **will/must be** uncomfortable with these thunderstorms passing by ...”

- (56) En zonas de Málaga, Jaén y Granada **será** fácil que el termómetro toque los 40 grados, y en Barcelona, Lleida, Girona y Tarragona las máximas **se acercarán** e incluso **superarán** ese registro. Los ciudadanos de la Comunidad

Valenciana son los que más **van a sufrir hoy, porque** ... (*El País*, August 30, 2010)

“Around Málaga, Jaén and Granada the thermometer **will/must** easily touch upon 40 degrees, and in Barcelona, Lleida, Girona and Tarragona the maximum [temperature] **will/must approach** and even **get higher** than this. The citizens of Valencia are those who **are going to suffer most today, because** ...”

Example (56) is interesting insofar as it also contains a use of the periphrastic future which seems to express an inference of such a high degree of certainty that the information is represented as a fact: “The citizens of Valencia are those who are going to suffer most today because ...”. The fact that they are going to suffer represents a consequence of the information about the weather given before.

With regard to the following uses of the synthetic future it might be argued that they are “more epistemic than evidential” so that it seems rather prudent – concerning the following examples – to speak about assumptions (Boye, 2006, p.66) instead of inferences. Nevertheless, generally one should not speak about an “epistemic future” – as Pietrandrea (2005, p.56) does – because speakers are assumed to always have a reason/reasons for stating that “*será* [p]”, which makes the future (at least to some extent) inferential in nature. But in the following examples the future forms cannot be analysed as being *clearly* used inferentially. As no further contextual information is provided that would lead to the assumption that the future forms are *clearly* used to convey an inferential reading, it seems rather prudent to analyse them as assumptions or conjectures:

(57) Después de la pérdida de calidad crediticia, ya **no bastará** con una moderación salarial en el sector público para convencer a los mercados de que España puede reducir el déficit al 3% en 2013; **será** necesario aplicar un plan de congelación de los sueldos públicos .... Tampoco **será** suficiente ... (*El País*, May 1, 2010)

“After the loss of credit quality, a salary moderation in the public sector **will not be sufficient** to convince the markets that Spain is able to reduce the deficit to 3% in 2013; it **will be** necessary to put a plan of payment stop of the public salary into action .... It **will also not be sufficient** ...”

(58) El presidente del Ecofin ha dado a entender que el rescate de Irlanda es inevitable porque “para el BCE **será** difícil ir más lejos a la hora de dar liquidez a algunos bancos ... (*El Mundo*, November 19, 2010)

“The president of ECOFIN made clear that Ireland’s rescue is inevitable because “going beyond giving liquidity to some banks **will/must be difficult** for BCE ...”

While the use of the future in examples (57) and (58) might be argued to be “more inferential than epistemic” because they are used in political or rather economic contexts (whereby I admit that there is no unambiguous proof in the contextual environment that they are used inferentially), the following two uses appear in more subjective contexts. Here, the future “only” seems to convey the speaker’s subjective assumption or subjective opinion (the inferential meaning aspect not being contributed by contextual information):

(59) Debemos estremecernos todos .... Sobre todo no hay tiempo que perder. Todo esfuerzo **será** menos molesto que esos seis grados más en verano. (*El País*, May 4, 2010)

“We all should shiver .... Most of all, there is no time to lose. Every effort **will/must be** less annoying than those six degrees more in summer”.

(60) “Sigue siendo un jugador de alto nivel y su aportación **será** muy buena, **será** un jugador importante para nosotros”, ha dicho. (*El País*, May 4, 2010)

“ ‘He still is a player on a high level and his contribution **will/must be** very good, he **will/must be** an important player for us’, he said”.

Even if the last mentioned uses of the future forms seem to be more “epistemic than inferential”, it should be emphasised that the category of inference is assumed to be the category where evidentiality and epistemic modality overlap. However, in every single use one domain is expected to be more prominent than the other. In the last mentioned uses the evidential domain is clearly not the more prominent one, whereby it is considered to be never completely absent. In line with Giacalone Ramat & Topadze (2007, p.25) I “prefer to highlight the inferential basis for the speaker’s confidence and to use the label inferential future” because in every case the speaker must have at least one reason to infer that “*será* [p]”. “The future can express judgments based upon an inferential process, which may be not explicit” (Giacalone Ramat & Topadze 2007, p.26). And the statement “the future does not serve the purpose of marking information as inferential” (Pietrandrea, 2007, p.42) has been refuted by the examples of the present study.

## CONCLUSION AND FUTURE PROSPECTS

With respect to the inferential use of the future, I subscribe to Giacalone Ramat & Topadze’s (2007) and Squartini’s (2001) view instead of to Pietrandrea’s (2005; 2007) because the former, for instance, state that “[t] the epistemic future is inferential in nature” (Giacalone Ramat & Topadze, 2007, p.26), while the latter claims that the future “only” expresses “the speaker’s genuine opinion about the propositional content” without indicating “any inferential process” (Pietrandrea, 2005, p.93). So Pietrandrea (2007, p.43) prefers to use the label



“epistemic future” instead of “inferential future”. Both Giacalone Ramat & Topadze (2007) and Pietrandrea (2007) investigate the inferential use of the Italian future and translate their examples into English by using the inferential modal *must*:

- (a) *Ora come ora, saranno le 5*  
“It **must** be five o’clock by now” (Giacalone Ramat & Topadze, 2007, p.25; my emphasis).
- (b) *[Suonano alla porta] Sarà il postino*  
[The bell rings] “It **must** be the postman” (Pietrandrea, 2007, p.42).
- (c) *Saranno le otto e mezza, immagino*  
“It **must** be eight thirty, I guess” (Pietrandrea, 2007, p.41; my emphasis).

Even though Pietrandrea herself translates the future by *must*, she explains with reference to example (c) that “[t]he genuine epistemic nature of the future is proved by the fact that the future (unlike the modals) can be employed in purely conjectural contexts, i.e., contexts lacking any evidential source” (Pietrandrea, 2007, p.41). As already illustrated above, the Spanish future is assumed to be always – at least to some extent – used inferentially because the speaker must have a reason that leads him to conclude that “it must be eight thirty”. He may be hungry; he may see the position of the sun etc. Incidentally, the English equivalent of *immaginare* “to imagine” was shown to involve affective evidence (slightly different from *believe*). So the semantics of the verb involves evidentiality (Cappelli, 2007, p.284):

In non-descriptive qualificational interpretations, the epistemic evaluation lexicalized by *imagine* is grounded in affective evidence, be it general knowledge of the world or personal taste and experiences. [The speaker] has no other evidence but his/her “stored knowledge” (Cappelli, 2007, p.283).

As the translation of the example illustrates, Pietrandrea herself translates *immaginare* by English *guess*. This verb was also shown to involve evidentiality, more precisely, inferentiality (Cappelli, 2007, p.234). Thus, it could be argued that the verb of cognitive attitude – whether translated as “guess” or “imagine” – and the future in example (c) mutually confirm that they are used inferentially. The speaker in example (b) maybe knows the time at the moment of utterance and at a certain time it is always the postman who rings. It is consequently an inference which is expressed by *sarà*: the speaker considers the time of day and infers from this information that “it must be the postman”. Utterances are always bound to a particular moment of speech and “contextless utterances” simply do not exist. So the analysis of contextless utterances should generally be avoided.

The future was furthermore shown to convey inferences of different strengths: *será + sin duda*, for instance, represents a stronger inference, while with *será + probablemente* a weaker inference is expressed. Hence, in contrast to Pietrandrea (2005, p.98), I would not describe the (Spanish) future as being “neutral as to the degree of certainty”.

Further studies should be concerned with the Spanish synthetic future as a means of expression of inference in the context of pragmaticisation processes. The synthetic future form is one means of expression that increased “in pragmatic force” (Traugott, 2003, p.633) during the pragmaticisation process (cf. also Häbler, 2003). In their study of demonstratives, Hayashi/Yoon define the process of pragmaticisation as a process

whereby grammatical items evolve into pragmatic markers that serve specific discourse functions to such an extent that they display a number of phonological, morpho-syntactic, and/or semantic characteristics that diverge crucially from their original usage as grammatical items (Hayashi & Yoon, 2010, p.58).

This definition of pragmaticisation process may be perfectly applied to the development of demonstratives but for the use of the Spanish synthetic future form, for instance, it must be highlighted that these are markers of subjectivity<sup>6</sup> that increased in pragmatic force. In contrast to the notions of “pragmatic strengthening” (Fried, 2009, p. 262) or “pragmatic narrowing” (Vega Moreno, 2007, p.205), the synthetic future should be considered under the heading of “pragmatic broadening”<sup>7</sup>. It fulfils different functions, and which function it is, depends on the respective pragmatic situation.

## REFERENCES

- Auwera, J. van der, & Plungian, V. A. (1998). Modality’s semantic map. *Linguistic Typology*, 2, 79–124.
- Boye, K. (2006). *Epistemic meaning: A cross-linguistic and cognitive study* (Doctoral dissertation). Copenhagen: University of Copenhagen.
- Bybee, J., Perkins, R., & Pagliuca, W. (1994). *The evolution of grammar: tense, aspect, and modality in the languages of the world*. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press.
- Cappelli, G. (2007). “*I reckon I know how Leonardo da Vinci must have felt...*”. *Epistemicity, evidentiality and English verbs of cognitive attitude*. Paris: Paris Publishing.
- Cornillie, B. (2009). Evidentiality and epistemic modality. On the close relationship between two different categories. *Functions of Language*, 16 (1), 44–62.
- Dendale, P., & Van Bogaert, J. (2007). A semantic description of French lexical evidential markers and the classification of evidentials. *Italian Journal of Linguistics (Evidentiality between Lexicon and Grammar)*, 19 (1), 65–89.
- Diewald, G., & Smirnova, E. (2010). *Evidentiality in German. linguistic realization and regularities in grammaticalization*. Berlin: Mouton de Gruyter.

<sup>6</sup> Although an inference may be intersubjectively comprehensible and possibly even rely on evidence that may be intersubjectively perceivable, if expressed by one speaker, an inference (or assumption) is subjective: at the moment of uttering [p], the speaker expresses his subjective opinion – regardless of to what extent the subjective inference or assumption might be intersubjectively comprehensible.

<sup>7</sup> This term is also used by Vega Moreno (2007, p.205). She, however, uses it in terms of idioms, transparency and pragmatic inference, as her study is about figurative speech.

- Fried, M. (2009). Construction grammar as a tool for diachronic analysis. *Constructions and Frames*, 1(2), 262–291.
- Giacalone Ramat, A., & Topadze, M. (2007). The coding of evidentiality: a comparative look at Georgian and Italian. *Italian Journal of Linguistics (Evidentiality between Lexicon and Grammar)*, 19 (1), 7–38.
- Gómez Rendón, J. (2006). Interpersonal aspects of evidentiality in Ecuadorian Quechua. *ACLCL Working Papers*, 1, 37–50.
- de Haan, F. (2006). Typological approaches to modality. In W. Frawley (Ed.), *The expression of modality* (pp.27–69). Berlin: Mouton de Gruyter.
- Haßler, G. (1997). Texte im text. Überlegungen zu einem textlinguistischen Problem. In G. Haßler (Ed.), *Texte im Text: Untersuchungen zur Intertextualität und ihren sprachlichen Formen* (pp. 11–58). Münster: Nodus.
- Haßler, G. (1998). Die markierung der herkunft des Sprecherwissens – ein grammatisches und pragmatisches Problem. In U. L. Figge, F.-J. Klein & A. Martínez Moreno (Eds.), *Grammatische Strukturen und grammatischer Wandel im Französischen. Festschrift für Klaus Hunnius zum 65. Geburtstag* (pp.169–191). Bonn: Romanistischer Verlag.
- Haßler, G. (2003). Modalisierung und vagheit in der italienischen pressesprache. In H.-I. Radatz & R. Schlösser (Eds.), *Donum grammaticorum. Festschrift für Harro Stammerjohann* (pp.115–129). Tübingen: Max Niemeyer Verlag.
- Hayashi, M., & Yoon, K-E. (2010). A cross-linguistic exploration of demonstratives in interactions: With particular reference to the context of word-formulation trouble. In N. Amiridze, B. H. Davis, & M. Maclagan (Eds.), *Fillers, pauses and placeholders* (pp.33–66). Amsterdam/Philadelphia: John Benjamins Publishing Company.
- Henneman, A. (2012). The epistemic and evidential use of Spanish modal adverbs and verbs of cognitive attitude. *Folia Linguistica*, 46 (1), 133–170.
- Hennemann, A. (2013). *A context-sensitive and functional approach to evidentiality in Spanish or why evidentiality needs a superordinate Category*. Frankfurt am Main: Peter Lang.
- Koch, P., & Oesterreicher, W. (1994). Schrift und schriftlichkeit. in *ein interdisziplinäres handbuch internationaler forschung* (pp. 587–604). Berlin: de Gruyter.
- Lazard, G. (2001). On the grammaticalization of evidentiality. *Journal of Pragmatics. Special Issue on "Evidentiality"*, 33 (3), 359–367.
- Lyons, J. (1977). *Semantics* (Vols. 2). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Lyons, J. (1995). *Linguistic semantics. An introduction*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Montolio, E. (1999). Las construcciones condicionales. In I. Bosque & V. Demonte (Eds.), *Gramática descriptiva de la lengua española* (pp.3643–3738). Madrid: Espasa Calpe.
- Nuyts, J. (2001). *Epistemic modality, language, and conceptualization. A cognitive-pragmatic perspective*. Amsterdam/Philadelphia: John Benjamins Publishing Company.
- Pietrandrea, P. (2005). *Epistemic modality. functional properties and the italian system*. Amsterdam/Philadelphia: John Benjamins Publishing Company.
- Pietrandrea, P. (2007). The grammatical nature of some epistemic-evidential adverbs in spoken Italian. *Italian Journal of Linguistics (Evidentiality between Lexicon and Grammar)*, 19 (1), 39–64.
- Real Academia Española (2010). *Nueva gramática de la lengua española. Manual*. Madrid: Espasa Libros.
- Simon-Vandenberg, A.-M., & Aijmer, K. (2007). *The semantic field of modal certainty. A corpus-based study of English adverbs*. Berlin/New York: Mouton de Gruyter.
- Squartini, M. (2001). The internal structure of evidentiality in Romance. *Studies in Language*, 25 (2), 297–334.
- Traugott, E. C. (2003). Constructions in grammaticalization. In *The handbook of historical linguistics* (pp. 624–647). Oxford: Blackwell.
- Vega Moreno, R. E. (2007). *Creativity and convention. The pragmatics of everyday figurative speech*. Amsterdam/Philadelphia: John Benjamins Publishing Company.
- Volkman, G. (2005). *Weltsicht und sprache. epistemische relativierung am beispiel des spanischen*. Tübingen: Gunter Narr Verlag.
- Wachtmeister Bermúdez, F. (2004). La categoría evidencial del castellano: Metonimia y elevación del sujeto. *Boletín de Lingüística*, 22, 3–31. Retrieved from <http://redalyc.uaemex.mx/redalyc/pdf/347/34702201.pdf> (23/07/2008).
- Wachtmeister Bermúdez, F. (2005). *Evidencialidad. La codificación lingüística del punto de vista* (Doctoral dissertation). Stockholms Universitet. Retrieved from <http://su.diva-portal.org/smash/get/diva2:199511/FULLTEXT01> (27/11/2007).
- Willett, T. (1988). A cross-linguistic survey of the grammaticization of evidentiality. *Studies in Language*, 12(1), 51–97.