

Historical Contributions of the Communist Party's Political Guidance for the Great Rear Area During the Anti-Japanese War in China

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Abstract

During the Anti-Japanese War, Chongqing was the center of the western region where was a great rear area for supporting the Anti-Japanese War in China. The Communist Party of China (CPC) mainly used political guiding methods to implement its political influence to various political forces in the great rear area. The Communist Party of China held high the banner of anti-Japanese and democracy to made important contributions for maintaining the cooperation with the party of Kuomintang (KMT), change the middle forces' recognition for the Communist Party of China, reform the political system, defend the Shensi, Kansu and Ningxia border region and so on. These activities had set up its historical position as a political guider in the great rear area, laid a solid foundation for the victory of the Anti-Japanese War, and realized the organic unity of the interests of the nation and the party.

Key words: Anti-Japanese War; The Communist Party of China (CPC); Historical contributions; Historical position

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INTRODUCTION

The incident on July 7, 1937 not only marked the beginning of Japan's all-out aggression against China, but also opened a new journey for Chinese resistance. In the country's stake, the Kuomintang (KMT) and the Communist Party through their policy adjustment eventually established an Anti-Japanese National United Front based on Kuomintang and the communist party cooperation, which laid a solid foundation for finally defeating Japanese imperialists and achieving the great victory in the Anti-Japanese War. As the center of the western region where was a great rear area for supporting the Anti-Japanese War, Chongqing became an important stage for various political powers. In this special historical background of the Anti-Japanese War, the Communist Party of China mainly exerted its political influence over various political powers in the great rear area without interfering Kuomintang government power. This kind of political guiding model made important achievements and thus set CPC historical position in the rear base.¹

The historical contributions of Communist Party's Political Guidance in the Great Rear Area mainly were in the following aspects.

¹ During the war of resistance against Japan, relations between CPC and Chinese main political forces are not clearly defined in academia. Though there is a lot of discussion about the contribution and historical position of the Communist Party during the war, the historical contributions and historical position of CPC should be different in different regions when we consider the complicated political situation. In the specific regions, the historical contributions and status of CPC should be recorded. Therefore, the purpose of this paper is to give a description about the historical contributions and historical position of the Communist Party of China in a specific region: The great rear area.

1. PERSISTED THE POLITICAL LINE: CPC SUCCESSFULLY SUSTAINED THE KMT-CPC COOPERATION AND SET UP THE FOUNDATION FOR THE VICTORY OF THE ANTI-JAPANESE WAR IN CHINA

The leader of CPC, Mao Zedong pointed out, "An important part of political line of Communist Party of China is the political line of unity and struggle with the bourgeoisie"(Mao, 1991, p.608). The key of the political line was the relation between the Kuomintang and the Communist party. Because the Kuomintang and the Communist Party did not reach a agreement in the cooperation program and the form of cooperation organization, the political reality of a strong Kuomintang and a weak Communist party made the inferior side, the Communist Party of China, face more challenge, which also needed the Communist Party of China to have more political intelligence to maintain the fragile relation between the Kuomintang and the Communist Party.

The Communist Party of China had placed the national interests in the first during the process of maintaining the KMT-CPC relations. CPC adhered to the "brother's quarrel at home but together resist against outsiders' invading", was tolerance for the national interests, and maintain the cooperation between Kuomintang and CPC. In the early Anti-Japanese War, the KMT and CPC had close cooperation in the political, military, cultural and other aspects, launched the Anti-Japanese and national salvation movement in the country, delayed the crazy attack of the Japanese army, broke the Japanese arrogant plan which planned to destroy China in three months, and made the Japanese army go into a war quagmire. The Communist Party of China repeatedly dispelled various doubts, repeatedly explained that Kuomintang and the communist party cooperation "was the cooperation for a long period of time, rather than a short period or playing a political game" (Mao, 1937/1993, p.53) and hoped the cooperation to be able to insist for a long time.

Except having something in common in the Anti-Japanese aggression, Kuomintang and the communist party had a lot of obvious differences, such as how to resist against the Japanese aggression, how to establish the country and so on; Kuomintang and the communist party also had a civil war for nearly ten years and the two sides had deep prejudices which might not be eliminated because of the Anti-Japanese aggression. So the relation of Kuomintang and the communist party was not stable and everything was not going smoothly. Early in the war of resistance against Japanese aggression, CPC pointed out that "In today's war of the anti-Japanese aggression, there are great risks." In the process of the war, "many setbacks, retreats, internal differentiation and mutiny, temporary and partial

compromise and other adverse circumstances may happen"². In comparison of power, the Communist Party of China belonged to the weak party, and Kuomintang already began to show "arrogant spirit, lack of self-criticism"³, "Internal contradictions and friction of the unity front are inevitable, and can only weaken but disappear" (Mao, 1937/1993, p.53). How to maintain the overall situation of the cooperation between Kuomintang and the Communist Party, and adhere it to the end of the war, was a serious challenge for the Communist Party.

Facing the differences and contradictions between Kuomintang and the Communist Party, the Communist Party of China had always adhered to the principle of both unity and struggle, kept struggle but not broken, fought for the unity, so that the cooperation continued to run although it encountered many difficult situations. Even in the Southern Anhui Incident, the Communist Party of China upheld the principle of "taking comprehensive offensive in politics and the defensive in military affairs"⁴, adhered to that as long as Jiang Jieshi did not announce a comprehensive breakdown, the Communist Party of China "is also not openly putting forward anti-Jiang slogan" (The Archives Hall of the Central Committee, 1941/1992, p.29). This strategy of seeking unity through struggle controlled the struggle between Kuomintang and the Communist Party and avoided a broken cooperation.

In the early days of the war, the Communist Party pointed out:

the fundamental policy for uniting the resistance powers of the whole nation is to consolidate and expand the Anti-Japanese National United Front, and the center link in consolidating and expanding the national united front is the close cooperation between Kuomintang and the Communist Party. (Chongqing Party School of CPC, para. 4, 1992, p.435)

"The cooperation between Kuomintang and the Communist Party is the basis of the Anti-Japanese National United Front and is the guarantee of founding the country and winning the war."⁵ In the whole war process, the Communist

² Decisions of the Central Committee on the Present Situation and Tasks of the Party" (1937, August 25). *Selected documents of Anti-Japanese National United Front of CPC Central Committee* (second volume, p.36). In The United Front Work Department of the Central Committee and The Archives Hall of the Central Committee (1986, ed.). Archives Publishing House.

³ Zhang Wentian and Mao Zedong's Telegraph to Zhou Enlai et al about the Propaganda Content after the Completion of the Communist Party and Kuomintang Anti-Japanese National United Front. (1937, September 25). *Selected important literatures since the founding of CPC* (fourteenth volume, p.536). In Party Literature Research Centre of CPC Central Committee and The Archives Hall of the Central Committee (Ed.).

⁴ Instructions of the Secretariat of CPC Central Committee for Zhou Enlai about taking comprehensive offensive in politics and the defensive in military affairs. (1941, January 25). *Selected Important Literatures since the Founding of CPC* (eighteenth volume, p.43)

⁵The Sixth Enlarged Plenary Session of Sixth Central Committee of CPC Political Resolutions. (1938, November). *Selected documents of CPC central committee* (eleventh volume, p.753). In The Archives Hall of the Central Committee (1991, ed.). Party School of CPC Central Committee Publishing House

Party had always paid attention to the center problem. As summarizing reasons for the victory of the war, the Communist Party of China pointed out: "The final victory of Anti-Japanese War is the National People's victory, and also is the victory of the Communist Party adhering to the Anti-Japanese National United Front and the correct guidance method in the Anti-Japanese War" (The Archives Hall of the Central Committee, ed., 1945/1991, p.583). Here, stressing the important role of the Anti-Japanese National United Front in the victory of the Anti-Japanese War is to certainly approve the cooperation between Kuomintang and the Communist Party of China. The Communist Party maintaining the cooperation between Kuomintang and the Communist Party was the most powerful support for the Anti-Japanese National United Front.

2. WON OVER POLITICAL POWERS: MADE THE MIDDLE FORCES HAVE MORE POSITIVE ATTITUDE TOWARD THE COMMUNIST PARTY AFTER THE WAR

The center and foundation of Anti-Japanese National United Front were the KMT-CPC cooperation, but not limited to the Communist Party and Kuomintang. "The Anti-Japanese National United Front is a united front of all political parties, all factions, all walks of life and all military and is a united front of workers, peasants, soldiers, teachers and students, businessmen, all patriotic compatriots." (Mao, 1937, September 29, pp.365-366). So middle forces became the objects that CPC united. The Communist Party of China pointed out seven middle forces and they mainly refer to the middle parties, local strong factions, the national bourgeoisie and the Democrats in the Kuomintang in the great rear area. The tasks of the Communist Party of China "are winning over the middle groups and making them progress and change" (Mao, 1937, November 12, pp.395-396). For "parties, groups and individuals closing to us, we should support their development"; "make influence on other parties and well intentioned criticize them in order to promote their progress or differentiation", "For middle individuals or groups, we should close to them for winning over them"; "we should respect for the local gentries of justice"⁶. In the war of resistance against Japan, for quite some time, the Communist Party did not have sufficient understanding of the middle forces, "For the time in Wuhan, CPC paid too much attention to the cooperation of Kuomintang and CPC, even had fantasy to get some results and completely neglected the small

parties and local power, to be terrified by Kuomintang which became easy to manipulate the situation"⁷. The situation was improved after the establishment of the South Bureau of the Communist Party which increased fighting for the middle forces and thought that the middle forces "can become the decisive factors in our struggle against the die hard" (Mao, 1940, March 11).

The main force of Communist Party was in rural areas as a result of the civil war of ten years. The party had also been influenced by the closed door policy for a long time and Kuomintang had long-term demonized propaganda about the Communist Party. The most of middle powers had no in-depth understanding of the Communist Party and the majority of them followed Kuomintang. Especially, they had deep doubt about the Communist Party having arms and bases. At the beginning of the war of resistance against Japan, although many of representatives of the national bourgeoisie supported the KMT-CPC cooperation, but they had misunderstand or even hated that the Communist Party of China had insisted on having the regime and the army, and adhering to the belief of communism. They thought that the communist regime and army were not conducive to the unified national government and military orders; at that time, many intellectuals also criticized CPC for its long and special relation with the Communist International. In 1936, Zhang Dongsun published an article and thought that "the slogan of hitting the imperialism was the Communist Party's own slogan", "China losses in all foreign affairs actually are caused by this megalomania slogan in past ten years", Kuomintang's one party dictatorship "comes from the Communist Party's method", "the Communist Party must declare to abandon the latent communism movement in the country at least in ten years in the national crisis", etc.⁸ Although Liu Shaoji wrote a letter to refute Zhang Dongsun's argument, but this argument represents many intellectuals' cognition at that time. In 1938, Zhang Junmai published "An Open Letter to Mr. Mao Zedong" and pointed out that "the troops should belong to the state", "the SAR system should be abolished", for giving up the belief of communism to "put the Marx doctrine aside temporarily"⁹. The founding Manifesto of China Democratic Political League put "the army nationalization" before "political democracy". These situations also illustrated the middle

⁶Zhou Enlai's Report Outline in the Conference of Political Bureau of CPC Central Committee (excerpt). (1939, August 4). Team for the historical materials of South Bureau of CPC (1990, ed.). *The Historical Materials of South Bureau: The United Front* (p.27). China: Chongqing Press.

⁷Zhou Enlai's opinions on the united front work to Kuomintang and other parties (1942, September 14). *The Historical Materials of South Bureau: The United Front* (p.81).

⁸Zhang Dongsun: "Review the Manifesto of the Communist Party and the National Cooperation". *The Cooperation of Kuomintang and the Communist Party during the Period of Anti-Japanese War* (first volume, pp.202-209).

⁹Zhang Junmai: "An Open Letter to Mr. Mao Zedong". *The Cooperation of Kuomintang and the Communist Party during the Period of Anti-Japanese War* (first volume, pp.622-623).

parties had doubt about the regime and the army of the Communist Party.

As the Anti-Japanese War going to the stalemate, especially the increase of friction between Kuomintang and the Communist Party, CPC attached great importance to the middle forces. Especially, after the establishment of the South Bureau of CPC Central Committee, CPC strengthened the United Front efforts to the middle forces. The Communist Party of China strengthened cooperation with anti-Japanese democratic parties and groups through supporting the middle forces to establish their own political parties; in case of major problems happening, CPC would had communication with middle powers early, seek their views and take the initiative to explain policies of CPC, and try to get the sympathy and support of the majority of the middle forces; warm welcome the middle forces representatives to visit the anti-Japanese bases of CPC. Through the deep and detailed work of the united front of the Communist Party of China, the middle power in the rear areas had greatly improved the relation with CPC and a lot of intellectuals also changed their inherent stereotype impression of the Communist Party of China, such as the China Democratic Political League eventually put the political democracy before the nationalization of the military in its guiding principle and more actively responded the idea of coalition government put forward by CPC. Although the middle forces still had different thinking of the road of founding the country, the ideological belief and so on, the middle forces had greatly improved their understanding of the Communist Party in the later war indeed. Not only that, the work of the Communist Party also had an important effect on the middle forces' final choice of following the Communist Party after the victory of the Anti-Japanese War. These results showed that the Communist Party did a good job to win over the middle forces in the great rear area during the Anti-Japanese War.

3. CREATED A POLITICAL SITUATION: SET UP A SOLID FOUNDATION FOR THE CHONGQING NEGOTIATIONS AND THE POLITICAL CONSULTATIVE CONFERENCE AFTER THE VICTORY OF THE ANTI-JAPANESE WAR

A Negotiation is based on actual power of parties and the power determines the content and result of the negotiation. The reasons for the Chongqing negotiations, Political Consultative Conference and other historical scenes happening after the war, although associated with the international factors, such as the US and Soviet Union relation and domestic political needs, the Communist Party of China strength was an important factor in numerous factors because the Communist Party's strength increased rapidly during the Anti-Japanese War.

During the Anti-Japanese War, the Communist Party's strength increased rapidly, especially in the armed forces, which benefited from the coordination work of CPC in the enemy's rear areas and rear areas of the battlefields. In the great rear area, the Communist Party of China made efforts to maintain the relation between the KMT and CPC and these efforts also made that the Communist Party of China was not attacked by enemies from both sides in Anti-Japanese War. It was in this context, the Communist army had greater development. In June of 1944, the Eight Route Army and the New Fourth Army reached total 470 thousands people, and the Communist Party was responsible for fighting with more than 1.1 millions of the puppet and Japanese militaries accounted for 84% of the total 1.34 million puppet and Japanese militaries. (Ye, 1944, p.91, 81) Less than a year, in April of 1945, Mao Zedong pointed out in "On Coalition Government": "We have a strong Communist Party of China with a wealth of experience and 1.21 million members", "there is a strong liberated District including 95.5 million people, 910 thousand militaries and 2.2 million militias". "The liberated District battles against 22.5 divisions including 320 thousand militaries, accounted for 56%" (Mao, 1945/1991, p.1043). The strength of the Communist Party made Kuomintang had to increase considerations about a political solution when Kuomintang considered solving the problem of the Communist Party. It was in this context, Kuomintang and the Communist Party could have the drama of Chongqing negotiations and on October 10, 1945, sign "The summary of the talks of the government and CPC representatives" which made a decision to convene the Political Consultative Conference to solve the pending major issues related with the two sides.

Since the beginning of the Sino-Japanese war, the Communist Party of China said repeatedly that it was against any civil war between Kuomintang and the Communist Party, and adhered to solve the disputes by negotiations peacefully. The Political Consultative Conference held in Chongqing and the Chongqing negotiations were the results which the Communist Party of China made consistently effort to oppose the war, strive for peace, and adhere to a negotiated settlement for existing disagreement in the great rear area during the war.

4. THE INNOVATION OF POLITICAL SYSTEM: THE ORIGINS OF THE NEW CHINA POLITICAL PARTY SYSTEM, THE SYSTEM OF PEOPLE'S CONGRESS, AND THE SYSTEM OF REGIONAL ETHNIC AUTONOMY

The time of the Anti-Japanese War was the most active period of the various political forces in China. Many political practices during the war of resistance against

Japan were absorbed, inherited and developed after the establishment of the new China. The new China party system, the system of People's Congress, the political consultative system, and national regional system were closely linked with the political practice in the great rear area during the war.

Under the leadership of CPC, the system of multi-party cooperation and political consultation is a basic political system of the People's Republic of China and is the political party system with Chinese characteristics. This system eliminates limitation of one party dictatorship of Kuomintang in the previous national political system, but the formation of this system must include the following elements: there must be a number of political parties, these political parties support the Communist Party and like to participate in the government to solve problems through political consultation. The formation of these elements is a result of political guidance of the Communist Party of China in the great rear area during the Anti-Japanese War.

During the Anti-Japanese War, the Communist Party's united front work for the middle forces created many favorable conditions for the formation of political consultation system. In the process of interaction with the middle forces, the Communist Party supported middle power forming organizations and political parties, strengthened communication with middle forces, solved problems through consultation, and actively expounded policies of the Communist Party with in-depth analysis of situations. These activities increased understanding of the middle forces to the Communist Party and had laid a solid organizational foundation for Chinese characteristic political party system.

So, in the period of Anti-Japanese War, the model of democracy was formed during CPC carrying out united front work in the great rear area. The model of democracy provided political guarantee for finally establishing the Chinese political party system and the system of People's Congress in 1949.¹⁰

In 1938, Mao Zedong in the sixth enlarged plenary session of the Sixth Central Committee pointed out: based on the ethnic equality, respect for minorities and opposing Han chauvinism, "in minorities and Han nationality mixed areas, the local governments must form committees managed by the local ethnic minority staff themselves, and committees as part of county or province government manage affairs related with them and regulate the relations between different nationalities. In province and county government officials, there should be ethnic minority staff." (Mao, 1938, p.620) The thought of the national regional autonomy has gradually become

a dominant ideology in the Communist Party of China solving national problems. On November 30, 1938, the Secretariat of the Central Committee of CPC held a meeting and decided to set up the Northwest working committee of the Central Committee, which presided over the secret party work of Northwest provinces outside of the Shensi, Kansu and Ningxia border region. The Northwest working committee combined other institutions which were in charge of the nationality work and specially set up a research institution carrying out systematic research work on Chinese minority problems. This was the first time in the history that the Communist Party of China established a specialized research institution for ethnic problems. According to the needs of the war, although the study of minority issues mainly focused on Mongolia and Hui nationalities at that time, it provided a reference to solve other minority issues later. In view of Kuomintang had a ruling government in the northwest, the practice of ethnic regional autonomy of the Communist Party could only be implemented in the border region. In 1942, the second session of the Shaanxi, Gansu, and Ningxia Border Region Council formally decided to set up Hui autonomous region in Xinzheng county of the central Shaanxi plain and Hui autonomous town in Huiliu village of Yanchi county. In the great rear area of the northwest, the study of minority policy of the Communist Party and the police practice in the border region laid a solid foundation for the system of regional ethnic autonomy.

5. THE EXPANSION OF POLITICAL INFLUENCE: THE COMMUNIST PARTY HAD TRULY BECOME A NATIONAL POLITICAL PARTY WITH A SIGNIFICANT IMPACT

Since the establishment of the Communist Party in 1921, it has had a rapid development. It became the second major political party after its first cooperation with Kuomintang. After Kuomintang's "purge", the Communist Party had been developing in the rural areas for a long time. The failure of the fifth "anti-siege" made the party suffer huge losses. It was forced to go a long march until arriving at northern Shaanxi. Especially in Kuomintang ruling areas, the Communist Party almost had not a completed division at that time. After the war broke out, more than a year, Mao Zedong's speech in early 1939 pointed out that "the Communist Party has a few people compared with the people of the nation. It is a small shareholder in the United Front. If we fight with Japan alone, it is more difficult." (Mao, 1939, January 28, p.148) At that time, although the public awareness about the Communist Party of China might be high in the nation, its strength was difficult to have a major impact.

¹⁰Zhou, Y., & Hu, D. N. (2002). *The work of the united front and its historical contributions of southern bureau of CPC central committee* (p.42). Party School Journal of CPC Central Committee" first (Ed.).

In the beginning of the Anti-Japanese War, the Communist Party only had more than 40,000 members. During the period of the war, the Party had grown. In the end of the war, the number of Party members reached 1,210,000, with whom, the number of the army members accounted for a large proportion. In the great rear area, there were nearly 100,000 members. Although the share was not high in the total, this result was not easy to get in so stringent circumstances under Kuomintang ruling. In building the organization, after the establishment of the Yangtze River Bureau in 1938, it actively recovered and reconstructed the South regional party organizations. The party and work committees of provinces had been established in the great rear area. The party organizations of provinces in the great rear area had been destroyed by Kuomintang around 1940, but at the end of the war, the Communist Party had relatively sound organizations and a considerable number of members in provinces of the great rear area. For the needs of situations, most of these members and organizations were in the private states, but most of them had considerable activity energy and the strong ability of social mobilization. After the outbreak of the civil war, they played an important role in the movement against Kuomintang throughout the nation.

Before the Anti-Japanese War, according to their own statistics of the Communist Party of China, the Eight Route Army's predecessor Red Army had 80,000 people and the New Fourth Army's predecessor Red Army guerrillas had 12,000 (Ye, 1944, June 22, p.83), and the total only was less than 10,000. In the early days of the war, the party told Kuomintang again and again: "the Red Army will be a strategic guerrilla" and "Today, the Red Army played no role in the decisive fights" because of its weak military strength.¹¹

At the end of the war, the Communist Party had more than 1.2 million members, more than 1.2 million military, the militia reaching 2.6 million, Anti-Japanese Democratic base areas having nearly 1 million square kilometers, and a population of nearly 100 millions. In the great rear area, although there was no the armed forces and bases led by CPC, the achievements mentioned above were greatly related to the Communist Party's efforts in the great rear area.

Before the Anti-Japanese War, many intellectuals thought that the Communist Party of China was an armed party to stick to the class struggle, have the belief of communism and the so-called "international background". The Communist Party was considered by many people as "the Warlord" who adhered to the "armed separatism" and tried to "split" in the Republic of China. Through the various forms of publicity and guidance of the Communist Party, CPC put forward many slogans

and policies which had been responded more positively in the great rear area in the process of the Anti-Japanese War. After the Anti-Japanese War, The influence of the Communist Party of China had undergone tremendous changes in the great rear area. At the beginning of the war of resistance against Japan, Mao Zedong put forward that we should make "the Communist Party of China become the party which is nationwide and has broad masses of the people with the complete consolidation in its ideology, politics, and organization" (The Party History Research Centre of CPC, para. 2, 2002, p.670) which were initially realized in the aspect of the influence after the war.

6. STRONGLY PROTECTED THE COMMUNIST POLITICAL CENTER OF THE SHAANXI, GANSU AND NINGXIA BORDER REGION AND THE NORTHWEST INTERNATIONAL PASS

The great rear area of the Northwest was an important pass to the Soviet Union and was an important barrier for the Anti-Japanese base and political center of the Communist Party—the Shaanxi, Gansu and Ningxia border region. During the Anti-Japanese War, the Communist Party recovered its organizations in Shaanxi, Gansu, Ningxia, Xinjiang and other rear areas of the Northwest and publicly established the Eight Route Army offices in Lanzhou of Gansu province and other places. The Shaanxi, Gansu and Ningxia border region had large barren lands and the people were poor there. All kinds of materials were extremely scarce. The Communist Party in rear areas of the Northwest mobilized people from all walks of life to donate for the war and a lot of materials was transported to the Shaanxi, Gansu and Ningxia border region through the rear areas of the Northwest. These donation and materials strongly supported the Anti-Japanese War. In the great rear area of the Northwest, Even in the period when Kuomintang and the Communist's relation deteriorated, the Communist Party also developed its organizations in various ways, supported democratic movements, discovered Kuomintang military deployment in the border region around, and effectively protected the communist political center of the Shaanxi, Gansu and Ningxia border region.

In the great rear area of the Northwest, there were the most important international passes which the Soviet used to aid China, especially Xinjiang and Gansu had played a decisive role during the war of resistance against Japan. In the early days of the war, there was a close cooperation between the Communist Party and Kuomintang authorities in these provinces to create a better cooperation atmosphere. The Communist

¹¹ Mao Zedong Chronicle 1893 - 1949" (second volume, p.22).

International also helped to transport a large number of military materials come from the allies to China, especially Soviet aided China mainly through the great rear area of the Northwest. These military materials played an important role in supporting the Anti-Japanese War and also were the witness for the world anti fascist allies working together.

The historical position of an organization is set according to its historical contributions. The great contributions made by the Communist Party in the great rear area of the Anti-Japanese War set up a historical position for the Communist Party in the great rear area. Comrade Song Ping had made a summary for the two battlefield functions of the Communist Party:

At that time, there were two battlefields: the liberated District with armed struggle in the front, this was the main battlefield; another battle was in the great rear area, in Kuomintang's area, and it was also an important battlefield. In the latter battlefield, our party had carried on the work in many aspects: establishing Party organizations at all levels; successfully carrying out the work of the United Front, uniting people from all levels, leading a lot of people, to support the Anti-Japanese War. It can be said, if there were not this battlefield, a lot of work and achievements achieved in the great rear area, it was difficult to obtain the military victory in the front battlefield.¹²

Because of the special situation in the great rear area , the Communist Party was mainly through the political guidance, this special form, to play its own unique role, namely the Communist Party had carried on its policy through the political guidance to influence the main political forces in the great rear area. Through the scientific explanation about the trend, the way and the ending of the Anti-Japanese War, the nation's future and development direction and other major issues, the Communist Party led the people in the great rear area to support the war of resistance against Japan, oppose the dictatorship of Kuomintang, seek democracy, and made a special contributions to the victory of the Anti-Japanese War. These special contributions give the Communist Party a historical position as a political guider in the great rear area of the Anti-Japanese War.

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