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Risk Communication Mechanisms in China Coping With the Risk of Digital Transformation of Society

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Abstract

In the process of promoting the digital transformation of the society, digital platform companies will transform the previously uncontrollable uncertain damage into controllable uncertain damage by reasonable risk decisions. but at the same time, unreasonable risk decisions will cause new uncertain damage and it is the main source of risk in the digital society. How to motivate multiple risk stakeholders such as government, digital platform companies and the public to jointly make reasonable risk decisions and practices is the dilemma of risk management in digital society. China has opened up the governance of digital platform companies to the government and the public through a dual cycle system of risk decision-making. These Institutional innovations are aimed at transforming in-company business decisions into public decisions negotiated by multiple risk stakeholders through constructing risk communication mechanisms, thereby enhancing the transparency, democracy and accountability of risk decisions. However, there are many problems in the construction of specific communication mechanisms, which hinder the regional development of digital economy in Asia. China should learn from other's experience and promote the convergence of risk communication mechanisms by more concrete measures.

Key words: Digital society; Risk management; system innovation, risk communication

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1. INTRODUCTION

The digital transformation of society triggered by information technology is a key variable of unprecedented change in a century. The global outbreak of COVID-19 has further driven the transformation process of digitization.In terms of the global governance situation, the government and various social fields have begun to carry out digital transformation with Internet platform as the core, and the government, companies and social organizations have gradually explored the opportunities brought by digital technology for management innovation. "Digital-era governance" (DEG) has become a hot spot of global concern.[1] Although the government and companies have improved their management effectiveness through digital transformation, new risk incidents involving digital platform companies, such as network security, personal information protection and big data discrimination, occur frequently, attracting the concern of the public of all countries.[2] As a result, risk and risk governance in the digital society appear frequently in government documents, academic researches and public discussion.

Immediately following a general introduction in Section 1, section 2 of this article begins with the connotation of the concept of risk, elaborating the unity of opposites between the positive and negative aspects of digital social risk, and thereby deduce the risk management dilemma faced by the digital transformation of society. In section 3, we will sort out the Institutional innovation practices of China in the face of the above risk management dilemma. On this basis, section 4 summarizes the common risk communication philosophy behind the Institutional innovations, and To further refine the construction of risk communication mechanisms.

[1] Dunleavy et al. (2006), p. 468.
[2] Zhang Yuyan (2019), pp. 1-4.

2. RISK AND RISK GOVERNANCE IN THE DIGITAL TRANSFORMATION OF SOCIETY

2.1 The Connotation of Risk and the Unity of Opposites Between Positive and Negative Aspects

The concept of "risk" originated after the Industrial Revolution. Before that, the concept of "danger" was often talked about. The key difference between the two is whether uncertain damage can be controlled through decision making. A situation is said to be "at risk" if the damage can be controlled by the decision or attributed to the decision, and if the damage is caused by the environment or other factors other than the decision，it called created danger.[3] Therefore, when we say that social digital transformation will produce a plethora of risk, it does not mean that the digital society is a more dangerous society, but rather that it is the inevitable result of the pursuit of security and the desire to control uncertain damage in social transformation. In other words, people use digital technologies such as Internet platforms and big data analysis to strengthen their control over various areas of society, so as to transform uncontrollable uncertain damage in traditional society into uncertain damage that can be avoided through decision-making. But at the same time, when we transform the danger into the risk, may lead to the expansion of the uncertain damage due to improper decision-making, even appeared a new riskiness to risk. Thus, there are two opposing connotations behind the concept of risk.

In a positive sense, the risk arising from the digital transformation of society will be an opportunity for people to control the damage of the uncertain future. When constructing Internet platforms and providing relevant information services in various social fields, digital platform companies provide technical basis and channels for collecting, analyzing and controlling information related to uncertain damage. For example, before the emergence of digital platform companies, administrative authorities' management could not control the damage caused by illegal information and bad information, but after the emergence of social media platforms, digital platform companies can accurately identify and block that based on network architectures such as "modular protocols" and "user reviews" for data collection and analysis. Social media platforms such as Twitter and YouTube in the US have developed a "hash" recognition technology that can automatically identify the types of images and videos (we can think of it as the "fingerprint" recognition technology of pictures and videos). They impede the distribution of child pornography and provide police with information on offenders by comparing hashed databases of child pornography already collected by the National Center for Missing and Exploited Children (NCMEC) with videos posted by users.[4] Another example is that administrative authorities cannot effectively control uncertain damages such as arbitrary charges, long detour and infringement of passenger safety by taxi drivers. Another example is that administrative authorities cannot effectively control uncertain damages such as arbitrary charges, long detour and infringement of passenger safety by taxi drivers. However, after the emergence of transportation platforms such as Uber and Didi, digital platform companies can fully and accurately grasp the location and relevant information of drivers and passengers. The uncertain damage of operating vehicles can be effectively controlled by reasonable route planning, pricing and recording.[5]

In the negative sense, digital platform companies may also make inappropriate decisions to seek commercial profits, thus expanding existing damage and causing new uncertain damage. [6] For example, when Facebook, Twitter and other social media platforms collect and analyze users' data in large quantities, they build a set of network architecture that Stop the spread of illegal and undesirable information through internal decisions of the company, so as to control the damage .However, It is also Potentially blocks specific value information in pursuit of profit maximization, and then manipulate public opinion to seek private interests and cause new internet risk.[7] In urban transportation, although transportation platform can construct a set of reasonable sent order based on the data to construct a set of reasonable sent order, pricing and punishment mechanism to control the driver creating uncertain damage to passengers, but due to the economic interests orientation ,it has enough motivation to use these systems to squeeze in the driver's labor value, causing the new labor risk.[8] Another example is in network transactions, e-commerce platform using the user evaluation and feedback data to build up the business reputation system and recommend sorting mechanism effectively eliminating the inferior products and services , but on the other hand the platform may seek improper interests using the system and mechanism , leading to the risk of a new type of unfair competition.

2.2 Risk Governance Dilemma in Digital Society

"Governance" refers to "the coordination of multiple stakeholders to jointly produce decisions and practices for something". [9]Therefore, the meaning of "risk governance" is to "coordinate multiple risk stakeholders to jointly make risk decisions and practices against future uncertain damage". The dilemma of risk governance

3 Nicholas Luhrman (2020), pp. 47-49.

4 Jeff Kosseff (2017), p33.
5 Wang Jing (2018), pp.41-45.
6 Julie E. Cohen (2017), pp.133, 134.
7 Shoshana Zuboff (2018), pp.1-24.
8 Natasha Bernal (2020).
9 Mark Bevir (2011), pp.1-16.

in social digital transformation is how to coordinate multiple risk stakeholders such as the government, digital platform companies and the public to make reasonable decisions and practices for uncertain damage in specific fields. Firstly, the government should not only provide space and incentive for digital platform companies to participate in governance, but also restrain and supervise the risk decisions and practices made by digital platform companies. Secondly, digital platform companies should not only pursue profit maximization, but also act as managers to safeguard public interests. Finally, the public should not only accept the constraints of the new governance mechanisms generated by digital technology, but also want to participate in the construction of the new governance mechanisms. However, under the existing government regulation and corporate governance system, this multi-agent centered risk governance model is difficult to achieve. the government is still regarded as the leader in the decision-making and practice of social governance, while companies and the public are more likely to provide information and feedback.[10] Companies are only regarded as financing tools of the government, instead of governance partners who make joint decisions, share risk and share achievements. As a result, companies are not willing to participate and the project completion rate is very low.[11]

At the enterprise level, due to the independence of corporate personality, corporate governance theory has always focused on adjusting the power, right and obligations among company members such as shareholders, directors, supervisors, senior managers and employees, so as to promote the members to make reasonable risk decisions together, in order to avoid a person decides alone cause damage to other company members, the whole company or creditors.[12]Therefore, the existing corporate governance system tends to focus on the interests of the company, shareholders, potential investors, employees, creditors and other internal members of the company, rather than bringing the government and the public into the scope of the company's internal decision-making.[13] This is because the existing corporate governance theories are based on the basic assumption that the essence of the company is identified as a market mechanism. Since 1937, From the perspective of economics, Coase identified the essence of the company as a price substitution mechanism in which capitalists are given limited command to allocate factors of production through the contract structure, corporate governance theory has been difficult to bypass this basic premise derived from economics.[14] With the continuous expansion of the scale of the company and the continuous extension of the fields involved, most of the subsequent discussions and theories have expanded the scope of stakeholders on the basis of this basic premise. In the 1930s, for example, when it came to light that large corporations monopolizing important industries like electricity, oil, and railroads were crushing workers and consumers, Burley argued with Dodd that the corporation was not just a profit-maximizing enterprise, but a social organization. The decision-making of company managers should not only be responsible for the interests of shareholders, but also for the interests of the whole organization members (including employees); In the 1960s, a series of social problems caused by large companies, such as environmental pollution and product safety, again aroused the debate between Berle and Dodd, and they believed that the decisions of company managers should be responsible for the interests of consumers and the environment.[15] However, the trend of the continuous extension of the scope of the company stakeholders also criticized by many scholars, the most typical is Friedman's idea in 1970 that "company managers are employees of the shareholders, if only to maximize the interests of the owners, rather than with the shareholders' money to serve the society, This can only undermine the free order of the market, and all companies have only one social responsibility, to engage in all activities that increase their profits, in accordance with procedures and business rules."[16] Since then, empirical studies on corporate social responsibility have focused more on the relationship between social responsibility and corporate long-term interests, which acquiesces to the economic hypothesis that the essence of corporate is regarded as a market mechanism.

Based on the existing government regulation and corporate governance system, risk governance in the digital society mainly has the following three dilemmas: (1) information barriers. (2) Absence of consultation procedure mechanism. (3) Responsibility allocation rules unclear.

3. INSTITUTIONAL INNOVATIONS IN CHINA TO COPE WITH RISK GOVERNANCE DILEMMAS

In order to deal with the risk management dilemma caused by social digital transformation,China set up a series of institutional norms around the relationship between digital platform companies, the government and the public in order to govern risk in different fields, so as to encourage the government, digital platform companies and the public to make joint decisions on specific risk. This section will summarize the different institutional innovations in China, laying a foundation for the subsequent comparative analysis.

10 Gerry Stoker (2018), pp.15-24.
11 Sun Yifeng (2018), pp. 142-151.
12 Ye Lin (2021).
13 Ye Lin (2021).
14 Ronald H. Coase (1937), pp.386-405.
15 Shanghai Stock Exchange Research Center (2007), pp. 4-5.
16 Milton Friedman (1970), September 13.

3.1 Double-Loop System of Risk Decision-making in China

In April 2021, the State Administration for Market Regulation, the Cyberspace Administration of China and the State Administration of Taxation jointly held an administrative guidance meeting for digital platform companies, which clearly proposed that China's digital platform companies should "strictly prevent system closure and ensure openness and sharing".[17] On April 21 of the same year, CAC put forward further requirements for digital platform companies to open their governance ecology: "Urge website platforms to improve community rules and establish governance ledger".[18] The governance of opening digital platform companies has become the main governance measures to deal with the risk of digital platform companies in China, which can be summarized as a double cycle facing to government and the public. (See Chart 1)



Chart 1
Double-loop System of Risk Decision-making in China

3.1.1 Measures for Digital Platform Companies to Open Governance to Government

In order to standardize and constrain the risk decision-making of digital platform companies, China has made a series of regulations on the internal risk decision-making procedures of companies according to different risk types. These regulations are as follows：(1) establish an internal risk management system for specific risk; (2) Full-time departments or personnel shall be designated to manage specific risk; (3) Risk assessment shall be conducted before decision making, and keep assessment report for government departments to refer to or submit; (4) Regularly conduct compliance audit on its risk decisions and submit them to government department, adjust its internal risk management system under the guidance of the government department. These measures are scattered throughout Chinese laws.

Regarding personal information processing risk, China's Cyber Security Law and Personal Information Protection Law stipulate a series of measures requiring companies to open their governance systems to the government. First of all, article 40 of Cyber Security Law requires digital platform enterprise to establish and perfect the system of personal information protection. Article 51 of the Personal Information Protection Law requires digital platform companies to formulate internal management systems and operating procedures for personal information processing, manage users' personal information by classification, delimit employees' rights to handle personal information, and formulate and organize the implementation of emergency plans for personal information security incidents. Secondly, the special responsible person system has been established. Article 52 of the Personal Information Protection Law requires that companies dealing with personal information of a certain scale should set up a person in charge of personal information protection, and let him supervise the personal information processing activities of the enterprise and formulate relevant protection measures. The enterprise shall disclose the contact information of the person and submit it to the relevant government departments. Second, established the beforehand risk assessment system. Article 54 of the Personal Information Protection Law requires companies to conduct regular compliance audits of their personal information processing activities in order to adjust their user information protection systems and internal management systems for personal information processing.

With regard to data security risk, China's Data Security Law also stipulates multiple measures. Article 27（1）of the Data Security Law requires digital platform companies to establish a whole-process data security management system, organize and carry out data security education and training, and take corresponding technical measures and other necessary measures. Article 27（2）requires digital platform companies that process critical data to designate a responsible person and agency for data security. Secondly, Article 29 of the Data Security Law requires digital platform companies to strengthen monitoring and assessment of data security defects and vulnerabilities and other risk during data processing activities, report security incidents to relevant government authorities. Finally, Article 30 of the Data Security Law requires that companies dealing with important data should carry out risk assessment on their data processing activities regularly, including the types and quantities of important data, as well as measures to deal with data security risk, submit risk assessment reports to relevant authorities.

[17] The Three Departments Jointly Held the Internet Platform for Companies Administrative Guidance; see - https://baijiahao.baidu.com/s?id=1696914247440370180&wfr=spider&for=pc (accessed 21 May 2021).
[18] Severely Investigate and Punish Internet Ecological Problems Intentionally Connived at by Websites and Platforms; see -http://www.legaldaily.com.cn/IT/content/2021-04/22/content_8489338.htm (accessed 21 May 2021).

About the risk of network information content, Article 9 and Article 15 of the Provisions on the Ecological Governance of Online Information Content require digital platform companies to formulate rules, manage rules and platform conventions for the ecological governance of online information content, improve internal governance norms such as information release review, comment review, emergency response and online rumors. The Regulations on the Management of Internet Users' Public Account Information Services require digital platform companies to establish a risk monitoring and assessment mechanism for public accounts. Article 9 and Article 15 of the Provisions on the Ecological Governance of Online Information Content require digital platform companies to formulate rules, management rules and platform conventions for the ecological governance of online information content, and improve internal governance norms such as information release review, comment review, emergency response and online rumors. The Regulations on the Management of Internet Users' Public Account Information Services requires digital platform companies to establish a risk monitoring and assessment mechanism for public accounts.

3.1.2 Measures for Digital Platform Companies to Open Governance to Public

In addition to opening up their governance ecosystem to the government, China also requires digital platform companies to be democratic and transparent when making risk decisions, allowing user participation and open to public scrutiny. Digital platform companies should have a democratic and transparent procedure to ensure social supervision and public participation when formulating relevant rules. [19] Specific institutional innovations include :(1) digital platform companies have the obligation to disclose to users relevant platform rules and decisions related to users' interests; (2) Digital platform companies have the obligation to establish channels for user to participate in establishing platform rules ,ensure users' right to choose when making decisions;(3) Digital platform companies are obliged to regularly disclose their platform governance results and open social supervision channels, so that digital platform companies can make risk decisions and optimize their practices according to public supervision opinions.

Regarding the risk of personal information processing, Article 41 of the Cyber Security Law requires digital platform companies to disclose the rules for collection, including the purpose, method and scope of collection and use of information, and obtain consent from users. If users do not understand these public rules, they can request companies to explain these rules in accordance with Article 48 of the Personal Information Protection Law. Finally, Article 58 of the Personal Information Protection Law requires digital platform companies who provides important Internet platform service，have a huge number users and have complex type business should set up independent agencies composed mainly of external members to supervise the personal information protection of companies, and regularly publish social responsibility reports on personal information protection to accept social supervision.

As for the risk of network information content, articles 15 and 17 of the Provisions on The Ecological Governance of Network Information Content require digital platform companies to disclose their platform content management rules and user conventions, publish annual reports on the governance of network information content. The annual report shall include the progress of governance, the performance of the person in charge of network information governance, and social evaluation. Article 33 of the Provisions also requires network information departments at all levels to establish a supervision and evaluation mechanism with the participation of the government, companies, society and netizens, and regularly assess the ecological governance of network information content service platforms within their administrative regions. Article 33 of the Provision also requires network information departments at all levels to establish a supervision and evaluation mechanism with the participation of the government, companies, society and netizens, and regularly assess the ecological governance of network information content service platforms within their own administrative regions.

4. THE RISK COMMUNICATION IN INSTITUTIONAL INNOVATION IN CHINA

4.1 Consensus on Risk Communication in Institutional Innovation

From the perspective of Institutional function, the Institutional innovation of China to deal with the risk of social digital transformation has something in common: to build a risk communication mechanism between multiple risk stakeholders. Here, "risk communication" has two meanings: (1) at the level of pragmatism, "risk communication" refers to the process and way in which risk decision makers obtain audience's attitude recognition and behavior coordination by disseminating information about specific future damage to stakeholders; (2) from the perspective of constructivism, "risk communication" is a process of building trust and order between risk decision makers and stakeholders, which enables scattered stakeholders to organize into a risk-taking community

[19] Large Platform to Establish a Scientific and Democratic Rules Should be Transparent, Allowing Users to Participate in; see -https://www.sohu.com/a/462812051_161795(accessed 21 May 2021).

through a communication mechanism.[20] In the context of risk governance in the digital society, Institutional innovation aimed at building a risk communication mechanism has the following three basic functions:(1) urge digital platform companies to disseminate relevant information about specific risk to the government, users and other stakeholders, and explore channels for the government and the public to reflect their opinions to digital platform companies, so as to break the information barrier between multiple risk stakeholders and strengthen the transparency of risk decision-making;(2) through the establishment of stable risk communication channels, digital platform companies can effectively negotiate with the government and the public on risk matters, so as to transform the business decision-making process with the main goal of maximizing interests into the public decision-making process with multi-stakeholder consultation, and strengthen the democracy of risk decision-making;(3) the establishment of a risk communication mechanism can generate trust in risk decisions among the government, digital platform companies and users, and form dispersed stakeholders into an organic risk-bearing body, so as to clearly disperse risk and allocate responsibilities and enhance the accountability of risk decisions.

If we observe the governance measures of countries around the world to deal with the risk of digital society from such a functionalist perspective, we can find that building a risk communication mechanism for the government and the public around digital platform companies has become a global consensus to solve the dilemma of risk governance in the digital transformation of society. For example，When the Federal Trade Commission addressed the data security and privacy violations risk posed by the collection of user data by companies like Twitter, Facebook and Snapchat, it requires digital platform companies to disclose users' personal data collection and usage rules, and regularly publish their online content ecosystem's platform governance rules and annual governance reports in response.[21] For another example, in the face of the labor squeeze risk caused by Uber, the US Federal Trade Commission required Uber to disclose a series of information.[22] With the accumulation of these practical experiences, the US Congress began to draft the Data Broker Accountability and Transparency Act of 2018 to promote risk communication between digital platform companies, the government and citizens by means of mandatory information disclosure.[23] Digital platform companies such as Google and Twitter also agreed to the amendment of section 230 of the Communications Decency Act, which stipulates that digital platform companies should disclose and explain content deletion rules on their platforms. In addition, the Digital Service Act and the Digital Market Act issued by the European Union on December 15, 2020，and Improving Law Enforcement in Social Networks Act issued by Germany also can find Institutional innovation aimed at building risk communication channels among multiple risk stakeholders, but the specific communication channels and procedures will be different.

4.2 Differences and Connections of Risk Communication Mechanisms

From the perspective of pragmatism, Chinese Institutional innovation focuses on requiring digital platform companies to submit pre-risk assessment reports and post-compliance audit reports to relevant government departments to achieve the effect of risk communication, which not only enables digital platform companies to fully consider public interests, policies and regulations when making risk decisions, but also allows governments to trust and support risky decisions made by companies. As for the risk communication between digital platform companies and the public, China focuses on the public disclosure of decision-making information, hoping that by setting up corresponding information disclosure obligations for digital platform companies, the public can understand the corporate decisions related to their rights and interests, and can reflect their opinions through relevant channels.

Comparatively speaking, Chinese existing risk communication mechanism is still not completely breaking the information barriers between multiple risk stakeholders. There are still communication barriers of risk information between a large number of government administrative organs and different departments of digital platform companies in China. In addition, in Chinese risk communication mechanism, the government and the public play the role of supervisors who care about results. They often do not actively participate in the decision-making process of risk, preferring to coach after the fact, punish and complain. Moreover, in order to achieve efficient decision-making, the functions and powers, operation procedures and consultation methods of the independent agencies need to be specially designed and stipulated, which is a challenge for policy makers.

From the perspective of constructivism, the Chinese government plays a leading role in the risk governance community of social digital transformation, and it has

[20] Laura N. Rickard (2021), pp.466-479.

[21] See In the Matter of Twitter, Inc., Fed. Trade Comm'n Matter No. 0923093 (Mar. 2, 2011) (Docket No. C-4316). In the Matter of Facebook, Inc., Fed. Trade Comm'n Matter No. 0923184 (July 27, 2012) (Docket No. C-4365). In the Matter of Snapchat, Inc., Fed. Trade Comm'n Matter No. 1323078 (Dec. 23, 2014) (Docket No. C-4501).

[22] See FTC v. Uber Techs., Inc., (N.D. Cal. Filed Jan. 17, 2017) (3:17-cv-00261).

[23] House Energy and Commerce Subcommittee (2018); see -https://www.congress.gov/bill/115th-congress/house-bill/6548/text(accessed 21 May 2021).

an absolute voice on Chinese risk governance order. Therefore, when constructing the risk management order of the digital society in China, the digital platform companies and the government are not on an equal footing. More often, the digital platform companies report the risk information to the government, and the digital platform companies strictly implement the risk decision made by the government. Chinese risk communication mechanism is conducive to the government guiding the direction of national digital economy governance, but the government's strong interference in risk decision-making is likely to dampen the governance enthusiasm and innovation space of digital platform companies. In the case of the lack of governance enthusiasm of digital platform companies, the development of Chinese digital economy is prone to the phenomenon of "chaos after being released, and death after being managed".

Specifically, future research and practice on the convergence of risk communication mechanism should at least include the following three contents: First, the construction of a mechanism to recognize the level of risk governance. In Japan's Personal Information Protection Commission's whitelist mechanism for cross-border data flows, digital platform companies in other countries can provide relevant information to Japan's Personal Information Protection Commission to prove that the country's personal information protection system is at the same level as Japan's, so as to obtain authorization for cross-border flows without the consent of data subjects and without the Commission's review. China should accelerate the construction of such an accreditation mechanism based on risk communication to realize the convergence of risk governance systems in each country. Second, build a mechanism for sharing risk information of digital platform companies across borders. In order to enable governments to trust the risk governance of other countries in dealing with the digital transformation of society, it is necessary to enable governments to share risk information of digital platform companies and to reach consensus and mutual recognition on risk governance measures in different areas. Finally, the development and establishment of multi-party agreements. The transnational development of the digital economy inevitably faces transnational governance decisions and practices of digital economy risks, and it is necessary to establish a risk communication mechanism between multinational governments and transnational digital platform companies by multi-party agreements.

5. CONCLUSION

Digital platform companies have made great progress in promoting the digital transformation of society, but the frequent occurrence of risk events in this process can hardly be ignored. Many academic debate has focused on the negative aspects of these risk, ignoring that these risk also represent an opportunity to control future damage from uncertainty. Centering on the definition of the three concepts of "risk", "risk governance" and "risk communication" in the context of social digital transformation, this article reveals the opposition and unity of the positive and negative aspects of digital social risk, and then points out the risk governance dilemma faced by the existing government regulation system and corporate governance system. And we attempt to further refine the risk communication philosophy of China to cope with this dilemma.

Through the research, it is found that digital platform companies will transform many uncertain damages into controllable uncertain damages when promoting the digital transformation of society. But at the same time, unreasonable risk decisions may expand such uncertain damage and cause a new riskiness to risk, which is the source of risk in the digital society. However, the existing government regulation system and corporate governance system are difficult to promote stakeholders to jointly make decisions and practice for specific digital society risk, which is the risk governance dilemma faced by the digital society. In order to deal with the dilemma, China has opened the governance ecology of digital platform companies to the government and the public through the Institutional innovation of the double cycle of risk decision-making.The Institutional innovation of both countries reflects the basic idea of building a risk communication mechanism between multiple risk stakeholders. This risk communication mechanism can transform the internal decisions made by digital platform companies alone into public decisions made jointly by the government, enterprises and the public, thus enhancing the transparency, democracy and accountability of risk decisions, thereby spreading the risks in the process of digital transformation of society and coalescing the government, digital platform enterprises and the public into an organic risk-bearing body. In addition, there are still many problems which will hinder the transnational development of digital platform companies. Therefore, China promote the communication mechanisms.