



A Study on Characteristics of U.S.-Pak Relation

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Abstract

U.S.-Pak relation is the typical example of the interactions between the global conflict and the regional conflict. The United States value Pakistan most is the contribution to the containment communism and counter terrorism. And Pakistan’s ultimate demand in the U.S. is to enhance the ability to resist India. The United States is much stronger and richer than Pakistan. The national interests of the two countries are often conflicting. All these result in the U.S.-Pak relation has many characteristics. The study of these characteristics is very helpful to understand the relationship between the two countries.

Key words: United States; Pakistan; Characteristic

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INTRODUCTION

U.S.-Pak relation is the typical example of the interactions between the global conflict and the regional conflict.

The United States value Pakistan most is the value of global level, in another word is the contribution to the containment of communism and terrorism. And Pakistani ultimate demand in the U.S. is the value of regional level, in another words are enhancing the ability to resist India. Domestic factors in both the United States and Pakistan also played an important role in the relationship between the two countries. The United States and Pakistan respectively attach importance to different level. The two countries have their specific situations. And there are huge differences between the two countries. All these results in the U.S.-Pak relation have many characteristics, which are significant in the following three points: inequity, instability, cognitive difference.

1. INEQUALITY

There is huge inequity in U.S.-Pak relation. As a superpower, the United States has a strong comprehensive national strength. So, U.S. had the leading position in the U.S.-Pak relation. And Pakistan was just a medium-sized developing country in south Asia. In many strength indexes, such as territory, population, economic strength, military strength and technological strength and etc, Pakistan was far behind the United States. Thus, Pakistan had a relatively weak position in the U.S.-Pak relation. Although Pakistan could rely on some favorable conditions to start the game with U.S., but find it is difficult to exceed the United States policy boundary.

In 1982 December, the Pakistani leader, general Zia ul Haq told Secretary of State Schultz, the United States and Pakistan established is an unequal alliance. (Dennis, 2001, p.361) Zia ul Haq’s Conclusion generally aligns with the facts. Moreover, the U.S.-Pak relation not only the aligned period had the characteristics of inequality, but also in other periods was too.

The United States was a superpower, which had globally interests. And U.S. had the most developed

economy and the most powerful military force. For the United States, although Pakistan was a populous Islamic country, but Pakistan was located in South Asia. In many national strength indexes, Pakistan was a medium-sized country, and the economy was very backward. Therefore, U.S. did not put Pakistan in a particularly important position. While in Pakistan, the United States had the extremely important position. Cause the United States was the most powerful country in this world. As a superpower, U.S. had the comprehensive national strength, could provide great help for Pakistan in the national defense, diplomatic and economic fields. Today, Pakistanis are still popular with a tease, but correct parlance that the fate of Pakistan is determined by 3 A: Allah, Army and America. The ordinary Pakistanis put the U.S. on equal height to Allah and the most powerful military. The importance of U.S. to Pakistanis was very obvious. Indeed for the Pakistani, U.S. was very important. The extent was much more than Pakistan's importance to the Americans. Although the U.S.-Pak relation often encountered difficulties, but Pakistan still hoped to establish and maintained good relations with the United States.

The degree of Pakistan cares the United States far more than the United States cares about Pakistan. So the United States was the side of higher status, and Pakistan was the side of the lower status. The attention degree of the Pakistan for U.S. is much higher than U.S. for Pakistan. In fact, apart from the period of the Afghanistan war in 1980's and 2000's, Pakistan rarely became the priority object of American diplomatic.

In international relations, the frequent degree of exchange visits between the leaders could be used as an indicator, to observe the two countries attach how many importances to each other. U.S. presidents only visited Pakistan for three times. And only two visits are the official state visits, and one visit is just a short stay. President Eisenhower in 1959 and President Nixon in 1969 are the official state visit. In 1967, President Johnson's special plane just landed at Karachi Airport. (Dennis, 2001, pp.361-362) In contrast to this, only Pakistan leaders' official visits or state visits to the United States are 10 times, 5 times to the corresponding figures of U.S. leaders' visits to Pakistan. The leaders who had state visit or official visit to U.S. are prime minister

Liaquat Ali Khan (1950), Prime Minister Muhammad Ali Bogra (1954), prime minister Huseyn Shaheed Suhrawardy (1957), President Muhammad Ayub Khan (1961 and 1965), Prime Minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto (1973 and 1975), President Muhammad Zia ul Haq (1982) and Premier Muhammad Khan Junejo (1986) and Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto (1989). (Dennis, 2001, p.430)

In the history of U.S.-Pak relation, the United States was always in the superior side, so the United States lacked the necessary understanding of Pakistan, did not considerate for Pakistani interests. In the view of many

American High-ranking officials, Pakistan was not the United States equal partners, in fact it is a draughtsman controlled by U.S. in the big game of international relations. In order to realize its national interests, the United States was willing to damage the national interests of Pakistan.

The United States believed that Pakistan was heavily dependent on American aid, and Pakistan also lacked of effective means to restrict America, so despite U.S. aware that Pakistan strongly disliked the rise of US-Indo relation, U.S. chose to ignore the feeling of Pakistan, tried its best to woo India. The U.S. concluded that, even if Pakistan dissatisfied the practice of the United States, but because too dependent on American aid, so the United States could easily repair the damaged relationship. After the 1962 Sino-Indo border conflict, the United States violated its commitments to Pakistan, did not negotiate with Pakistan, then decided alone to provide military assistance to India. National Security Council member Komer told President Kennedy in the memorandum, Pakistan was too dependent on American aid, so would not make too radical reaction to the U.S. aid to India. Komer pointed out: "I am convinced that Pakistan knows it gets too much benefit from the United States. If cut the ties with the United States, Pakistan would suffer heavy losses." (Smith, 1996, p.375) In fact, Pakistan felt extremely offensive for U.S. aid to India. The American ambassador to Pakistan Walter P. McCaughy believed that President Ayub Khan had never forgiven President Kennedy. Cause President Kennedy did not comply with the commitment which before make decision to provide military assistance to India, U.S. would negotiate with Pakistan. Ayub Khan is a Pashtun, extreme regard personal commitment. To Ayub Khan, this is a very serious offense. (Dennis, 2001, p.131)

Except U.S. disregard the feeling of Pakistan to U.S.-Indo relation, also frequently used aid as threatening weapon to Pakistan. In August 12, 1963, President Kennedy called Secretary of State Dean Rusk and Deputy Secretary of state George Ball and others to discuss the U.S.-Pak relation. Kennedy is openly pointed out: "Ayub Khan wants us to put pressure on India to resolve the Kashmir issue. But we could not meet his requirements. Cause we could not get much benefit from Pakistan. For us, only the Pakistan based intelligence facilities have value." *President Kennedy has proposed to George Ball, who had a upcoming visit to Pakistan:*

We'd better remind Pakistani: We don't like communist China. We have to stop Pakistan from the anti American newspaper publicity which would lead to serious consequences, and tells the Pakistani: Peshawar's intelligence facilities are very important to us. If Pakistan didn't do what we want, we would stop providing assistance to Pakistan. (Smith, 1996, pp.635-639)

So, George Ball told Pakistani: "We very much hope President Ayub will not carry relations with Red China to

a point where it impairs a relationship which we have.” (Rashmi, 2007, p.48)

2. INSTABILITY

The U.S.-Pak relation had great instability. The U.S.-Pak relation in the mid 1950's to the early 1960's was very friendly, but was in a very weak status in 1962 to 1968. Despite the U.S.-Pak relation from 1969 to 1976 had a little improvement, but could not resume the harmonious state. From 1977 to 1980, is another cold winter of the U.S.-Pak relation. From 1981 to 1989, is the second warm spring of the U.S.-Pak relation. From 1990 to 2001, the U.S.-Pak relation was fall into the trough. The U.S.-Pak relation has seen periodic rise and fall, causing U.S.-Pak relation was in a very unstable state.

In August 14, 1947, Pakistan was established. In the same year, U.S. announced the Truman doctrine, the cold war began. U.S. became the leader of the anti Communism camp. At that time, the goal of U.S. in the South Asia is India, not Pakistan. Cause India had large population, vast territory and rich international influence. So, U.S. did not pay much attention to Pakistan.

However, India insisted its neutralism foreign policy; did not want to join the Western camp. At this time, U.S. found that Pakistan has a very superior strategic value, so U.S. began to view Pakistan as potential partner which could contain the Soviet Union's expansion in the south direction towards the Middle East. In order to obtain the support of U.S. to fight against the India, Pakistan was willing to join the U.S. led containment system. Therefore, U.S. and Pakistan formed military alliance in 1954 in their different motives. However, with the change of international situation, some problems emerged and stroked the U.S.-Pak relation. Then the U.S.-Pak relation gradually cooled down under President Kennedy and President Johnson ruling period. Finally in 1965, when the second Indo-Pak war burst, the U.S.-Pak relation fell to a low point. Although the U.S.-Pak relation had improved under President Nixon and President Ford's reign, but fell into the abyss under Carter ruling period due to a series of problems such as the nuclear issue. In the 1980's, President Reagan and President Bush's ruling period, U.S. and Pakistan joined together to fight the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. This was a booster for the U.S.-Pak relation, but after the Soviet Red Army withdrew from Afghanistan and Pakistan persisted on nuclear development, the U.S.-Pak relation once again fell into the abyss.

The reason why the U.S.-Pak relation encountered so many ups and downs is the national interests and national security policy of U.S. and Pakistan often had serious conflict. At a glance, under President Eisenhower, President Nixon and President Reagan ruling period, the national interests and national security policy of

U.S. and Pakistan were consistent. However, under President Kennedy, President Johnson, President Carter and President Bush ruling period, the national interests and national security policy of U.S. and Pakistan had great differences. (Dennis Kux, 2001, p.360) Because the security objectives of U.S. and Pakistan did not have long-term overlap, so the U.S.-Pak relation lacked of a solid common national interests basis, it was difficult to avoid serious differences and frequent disputes. So, the U.S.-Pak relation appeared unstable state.

The core of Pakistan's foreign policy was guarded against India, and contest with India for the Kashmir. Pakistan always paid too much attention to India. This made Pakistan often take some policies which made U.S. felt very dissatisfied. This induced the damage of the U.S.-Pak relation. First of all, Pakistan improved relations with China and the Soviet Union in the early 1960's. When Pakistan changed the course of her foreign policy, the United States resented the move. (Chaudhri, 1970, p.52) Cause its ally Pakistan unexpectedly established intimate relation with China. And China was a rival of America. Then, Pakistan makes war with India for Kashmir in 1965. s Pakistan used the U.S. arms in this war. This made U.S. felt very confused. After this war, the U.S.-Pak relation fell into the trough.

Finally, in order to balance national strength and military advantage of India', to defend national interests, Pakistan started secret nuclear program in the mid 1960's, then restart and promote the nuclear program in 1990, which led to many blocks of the U.S.-Pak relation during President Ford, President Carter and President Bush ruling period. For U.S., even the U.S.-Indo relation often alienated, but never regards India as the enemy. Nixon and Kissinger claimed that vigorous American action deterred India from dismembering West Pakistan.(Venkataramani, 1984, pp.397-398) In fact, except President Nixon deter India from invade and annex western Pakistan territory in the third Indo-Pak war, U.S. would never stand in Pakistan against India. (Dennis, 2001, pp.360-361)

The core of American foreign policy was cold war and counter terrorism. Before President Nixon took office, China was a long term target of the containment. America wanted Pakistan to help containing the Soviet Union and China. When Pakistan met American expectation to play an active role of the ally, the U.S.-Pak relation would be more smoothly. When Pakistan sought its own national interests, contrary to American willingness to improve relations with the Soviet Union and China, the U.S.-Pak relation would encounter difficulties. In addition, America made great efforts to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons. Because Pakistan refused to bow to American pressure, adhere to the nuclear development, the U.S.-Pak relation encountered many difficulties. The instability of the U.S.-Pak relation reflected the reality that the national interests of Pakistan and America sometimes overlapped, sometimes clashed.

3. THE COGNITIVE DIFFERENCE

U.S. and Pakistan had serious cognitive differences. Cognitive differences originated from two countries focused on different aspects. While the U.S. focus was worldwide, Pakistan's primary focus remained regional. (Kheli, 1982, p.151) U.S. attached great importance to the global conflict, such as the cold war and anti terrorism, could not understand the Pakistani dread against India, and also questioned the authenticity of Pakistani fear against India. Pakistan attached importance to the regional conflict with India, and was difficult to follow U.S. to contain the Soviet Union and China, and began to improve relations with the Soviet Union and China from the early 1960's. Cognitive differences between the two countries were also reflected in the orientation of the nuclear issue.

American formed an alliance with Pakistan based on global conflict considerations; the main intention was to improve the containment system and counter terrorism system. U.S. only viewed Pakistan as a small partner. As for the disputes between Pakistan and India, U.S. could know Pakistani concerns about India, but could not understand the feelings of Pakistan. U.S. believed that Pakistani concerns about India were overblown. Cause India did not want to take the initiative to invade Pakistan. President Kennedy had expressed this idea. In August 12, 1963, President Kennedy met with Secretary of state Dean Rusk and Deputy Secretary of state George Ball and other officials to discuss the problems of U.S.-Pak relation. During the meeting, President Kennedy admitted that he totally didn't agree with Pakistani views about India: "Pakistan was not worried about the threat from India, but worried about the loss of ability to contend with India. India would not take the initiative to attack Pakistan, because it will cost a billion dollars in military expenditure." (Smith, 1996, pp.635-639) President Kennedy's statement had been challenged in the third Indo-Pak war. Because India had taken initiative to invade East Pakistan, did not want to lose the opportunity of dismember Pakistan even it would consume a large number of military expenditure.

Pakistan formed an alliance with U.S. based on the consideration of the regional conflicts; the main intention was to get the U.S. military and economic aid, to balance the advantages of India and protect national security. The former foreign minister and Prime Minister Muhammad Ali Bogra pointed out: "Our only objective is to defend the stability and security of Pakistan. Therefore, we need to get supports of like-minded and peace-loving countries. We never hide the fact that India is the number one threat of Pakistan." (Sayeed, 1961, p.232) For the global conflict, Pakistan could not spare any effort to support U.S. without reservation. During the Bandung Conference in 1955, Prime Minister Muhammad Ali Bogra held two meetings with Premier Zhou Enlai. Prime Minister Muhammad Ali Bogra told the Premier Zhou

Enlai: The aim of Pakistan joined the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization was not to against China, was only to prevent from the invasion of India. Pakistan would not participate in the U.S. led war towards China. Zhou Enlai was no doubt greatly impressed by Pakistani Prime Minister Muhammad Ali's straightforwardness. (Sherwani, 1980, p.66) China accepted the interpretation of Pakistan. A few days later, Premier Zhou Enlai pointed out at a press conference that China had already reached a mutual understanding with Pakistan. Prime Minister Muhammad Ali Bogra was confirmed on the spot. (Garver, 2001, p.191)

U.S. and Pakistan had extremely cognitive differences on Pakistan nuclear development problems. U.S. viewed Pakistani nuclear development as the problem of global level; believed that Pakistani nuclear issue related to the global non-proliferation efforts, it was not a problem of Pakistan itself or regional issues in South Asia. For example, in the beginning of 1976, the Ford administration strengthened the export control of sensitive products to some countries including Pakistan. These countries had not signed the "nuclear nonproliferation treaty", and did not permit the international community to examine all of their nuclear facilities. In August 1976, Secretary of state Kissinger visited Pakistan, tried to persuade Pakistan to stop its nuclear development. Kissinger pointed out to Ali Bhutto: the Democratic Party was likely to win the presidential election. Democrats would take more stringent measures on nuclear proliferation, and are likely to punish Pakistani nuclear development, to deter other country like Pakistan. (Dennis, 2001, pp.221-222)

And Pakistan viewed nuclear issue as a matter of national survival; the aim was to deter India. Therefore, Pakistan viewed nuclear development as a problem in South Asia, rather than the global level problem. For example, in 1979, U.S. insisted on sanctions to Pakistan on nuclear development. (Thornton, 1982, p.967) Pakistan was very angry. What Made Pakistan felt most uneven is that U.S. did not punish India, and India had really exploded a nuclear device. Just like a Pakistani senior official said: "If U.S. had impose sanctions on India, we won't be so mind. We could understand American favor Israel. It is a special case. But we could not understand, since U.S. refused to sanction India, why U.S. pressed Pakistan so severely." (Dennis, 2001, p.239) Similarly, in 1990, U.S. imposed sanctions on Pakistan. What made Pakistan felt angry was that U.S. imposed sanctions against Pakistan, but did not impose sanctions on India. And India itself was the country which had exploded a nuclear device in 1974. (Dennis, 2001, p.310)

In fact, the cognitive differences of Pakistan and U.S. on the nuclear issue highlights the U.S. and Pakistan were in different status and situation. From the perspective of international status, U.S. was a global superpower, mainly focused on global issues, thought a problem mainly focused on the global level, lacked the understanding

of regional problem. Pakistan is a medium country in South Asia, mainly focused on regional problems, thought a problem mainly focused on the regional level, lacked of awareness of consider problem from a global perspective. From the perspective of the situation, U.S. was the inventor of nuclear weapons, also had many nuclear weapons than most of countries, did not hope that more countries to hold nuclear weapons. Therefore, U.S. viewed Pakistani nuclear issue was a kind of issue whether compliance with international rules. But Pakistan was a country which always worried about India annexation. Pakistan engaged in nuclear development was to defend the national survival, the main objective is to balance Indian absolute superiority of the national strength and the military force. After India had a nuclear test in 1974, Indian advantages over Pakistan expanded further. Pakistani fears about India deepened further, more unlikely to stop its nuclear development. Therefore, the views of U.S. and Pakistan on nuclear development were totally different. As for Pakistani view, nuclear development issue was a life-and-death problem.

CONCLUSION

After the foundation of Pakistan, U.S.-Pak relation encountered many ups and downs. Since the Soviet Union collapsed, containing the Soviet Union, the global factor which had long dominated the U.S.-Pak relation did not exist. But the nuclear issue and Kashmir issue which had influenced the U.S.-Pak relation in the past were continue to exist, and flared up in the late 1990's in a more radical form. Moreover, the problem of terrorism derived from the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan to some extent became

the focus of global attention at the beginning of the 21st century, and it influencing the U.S.-Pak relation today. Although the U.S.-Pak relation had experienced many changes after the cold war, but the structural factors of U.S.-Pak relation did not change. Therefore, the characteristics of U.S.-Pak relation continue to exist in this period, and would not have too much change in the foreseeable future.

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